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VOLUME 74 WINTER 2000 NUMBER 1
IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
JURY TRIAL OF EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN
NEW YORK?
BERNARD E. GEGANI
This article is dedicated to the memory of Benjamin N.
Cardozo, whose insight into the law made the crooked straight
and the rough places plain.
INTRODUCTION
The subject of this article is the constitutionality of section
4101 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR),
which, in addition to setting forth the traditional legal actions
triable by jury as of right,1 also provides "that equitable defenses
and equitable counterclaims shall be tried by the court."2 Under
the former Civil Practice Act,3 which the CPLR replaced in
1963, 4 all defenses, whether legal or equitable, were triable in
the same manner as the plaintiffs action;5 only counterclaims
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CPLR 4101 provides for a jury trial in:
1. an action in which a party demands and sets forth facts which would
permit a judgment for a sum of money only;
2. an action of ejectment; for dower; for waste; for abatement of and
damages for a nuisance; to recover a chattel; or for determination of a
claim to real property under article fifteen of the real property actions and
proceedings law; and
3. any other action in which a party is entitled by the constitution or by
express provision of law to a trial by jury.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101 (McKinney 1992).
2 Id.
3 See Act of May 21, 1920, ch. 925, 1920 N.Y. Laws 19 (vol. 4) (repealed 1962).
This Act took effect on Apr. 15, 1921. See id. § 1540, 1920 N.Y. Laws at 521.
4 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 10005 (McKinney 1981) (setting forth the effective date of
the act as Sept. 1, 1963). One year before this act took effect, there was an
amendment to the New York State Constitution that changed the structure of the
courts and judicial administration. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 37.
5 See Act of May 21, 1920, ch. 925, §§ 422, 425, 1920 N.Y. Laws
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW [74:1
were accorded a mode of trial of their own, independent of the
action.6
Thus, for example, if a plaintiff brought an action on a
written contract calling for the defendant to pay $1,000 for a
service, the defendant might answer that the true agreement
was for a payment of $100 and that the written contract was the
product of a drafting mistake. Because the plaintiffs action was
for a sum of money only, it was triable by jury as of right. Prior
to the CPLR, the issue of fact raised by the defense was also
triable by jury as of right, notwithstanding its equitable
character. Under the CPLR, the equitable defense is triable by
the court alone.
The legislature was assured by the New York State
Advisory Commission on Practice and Procedure that
recommended the CPLR that there was no constitutional
problem with the revised rule.7 The leading treatise on New
York Practice echoed this assurance,8 and few voices have
questioned it in the years since 1963 when the CPLR was
adopted.9 The constitutional question, however, took on a
greater urgency in 1996 when the Appellate Division, First
Department, in Hudson View 11 Associates v. Gooden,10 stated
that CPLR 4101 was indeed unconstitutional in providing for a
19, 157 (repealed 1962).
6 See id. § 424, 1920 N.Y. Laws at 157; see also Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A. 0.
Andersen & Co., 146 N.E. 381, 384-85 (N.Y. 1925) (applying section 424 of the Civil
Practice Act).
7 See N.Y. STATE ADVISORY COMM. ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SECOND
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
Legis. Doc. No. 13, at 217 (1958) (stating "[tihe proposal [which is now CPLR 41011
raises no constitutional question because trial by jury is not required for equitable
issues").
8 See 8 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: CPLR
4101.38, at 41-78 (1999) ("The right to a jury trial on equitable defenses is not
constitutional, as it was not available prior to 1777 and was not afforded by statute
enacted prior to 1894.").
9 In his Practice Commentary to section 4101 of McKinney's CPLR, Professor
Siegel suggested that "the language of CPLR 4101 about equitable 'defenses' being
triable by the court may be too sweeping, and run afoul of the constitutional right to
trial by jury, which depends on common law antecedents." See David D. Siegel,
Practice Commentaries to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101, at 191 (McKinney 1992). This author
has discussed the topic briefly and questioned the power of the legislature to repeal
jury trial of equitable defenses. See Bernard E. Gegan, Turning Back the Clock on
the Trial of Equitable Defenses in New York, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 823, 829-30
(1994).
10 644 N.Y.S.2d 512 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1996).
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non-jury trial of equitable defenses raised in cases in which the
plaintiff's action was triable by jury.1 Because the court
concluded that the equitable defenses in the case before it did
not fall within that category,12 its brief examination of the
constitutional question must be regarded as dictum, but it is
dictum of a most deliberate character. It now seems inevitable
that the constitutional question must soon be decided once and
for all. Because the issue is a complex one involving some
obscure legal history, it may be of service to examine it in depth.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Any statute that restricts the right to jury trial must comply
with the existing New York Constitution of 1938, which states
that: "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
forever.... ."1 In order to identify what rights to a jury trial
were constitutionally guaranteed prior to the adoption of the
constitution of 1938, it is necessary to take a step back and
13 See id. at 515.
12 The court's opinion is somewhat vague on a critical point. The plaintiffs,
owners of housing projects, sued the managers for damages for breach of contract,
conversion, and for their removal as general partners and managing agents. See id.
at 513. The court correctly noted that this joinder of legal claims with an equitable
claim based on the same transaction resulted in plaintiffs' waiver of jury trial on all
legal claims, but that the defendants retained the right to jury trial of the legal
claims, presumably breach of contract and conversion. See id. at 516. The court said
that the defendants set up legal and equitable defenses to plaintiffs' causes of
action together with counterclaims for the reasonable value of their services. See id.
The court concluded that the counterclaims were legal, not equitable, so that no
waiver could result from their assertion. See id. The remaining question was how to
try the equitable defenses, the substance of which the court left unspecified. As
stated in the above text, the court said that with respect to the legal actions
enumerated in section 968 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its successor, section
4101 of the CPLR, see supra note 1, jury trial of equitable defenses "would be
constitutionally protected to the present time" because they were triable by jury
under the statute prior to the constitution of 1894. Hudson View 11 Assocs. 644
N.Y.S.2d at 514.
It is not totally clear why the court concluded that defendants were not entitled
to a jury trial of their equitable defenses. This conclusion is understandable if said
defenses were set up only in relation to the equitable claim for defendants' removal
as managing agents, because an equitable defense to an equitable claim was never
triable by jury. But if the unspecified equitable defenses were set up in relation to
the legal claims for breach of contract and conversion, then the court's conclusion is
not consistent with its position on the constitutional question. Unfortunately, the
opinion does not specify which defenses related to which claims.
13 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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consider its predecessor, the constitution of 1894. That
constitution contained slightly different language. It provided
that: "The trial by jury in all cases in which it has been
heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever ... ." 14 The same
language appears in all previous New York state constitutions,
including the constitution adopted in 1846;15 its predecessor of
1821;16 and the first constitution of 1777.17
The key reference in each of these constitutional provisions
are the words "heretofore used." To what period does
'heretofore" refer? And what is meant by "used"? The easiest
way to approach an answer is to look at the first constitution of
1777 through which New York passed from colony to statehood.
The only possible meaning of 'heretofore" was as a reference to
the period immediately preceding the adoption of that
constitution. Since there was no previous written constitution,
the reference to "used" must have meant the time honored
custom of using juries in the common law courts, but not in the
courts of equity.18 Equity's discretionary use of juries in an
advisory role was not covered by the guarantee, which applied
only to the use of juries as a matter of right in the law courts. 19
The problem with which this article is concerned arises
because the period covered by heretofore used" did not remain
static. Unlike the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution, 20 which has remained unchanged since 1791, the
practice in New York has been to supersede the existing
14 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1894).
15 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1846).
16 See N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1821).
17 The language used in 1777 was slightly different: "trial by jury, in all cases,
in which it hath heretofore been used in the colony of New York, shall be
established, and remain inviolate forever." N.Y. CoNsT. art. XLI (1777).
18 See Malone v. Saints Peter & Paul's Church, 64 N.E. 961, 962 (N.Y. 1902)
(noting that the word "used" referred to common law customs).
19 See In re Gurland, 146 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1955) (holding
that there was no right to a jury trial under the Mental Hygiene Law if the right
was not previously conferred as part of the common law).
20 The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states that:
In [sluits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. This provision applies only in the federal courts, not in the
state courts. See generally Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211
(1916); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
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constitution periodically and replace it with an entirely new one.
As each successive constitution was adopted, the "heretofore
used" clause was said to be applicable to each newly adopted
constitution.21  The periodic updating of the timeline for
applying the guarantee was coupled with holdings that "used" in
the constitutional formula included the use of juries established
by statutory enactment as well as immemorial common law
tradition. Thus, for example, a case not triable by jury at
common law, but made triable by jury for the first time by
statute passed in 1830, was held to be within the guarantee
contained in the constitution of 1846.22
The practical effect of this process was that a right to jury
trial created by the legislature remained subject to modification
or repeal only as long as it remained solely a statutory right. If
the statute remained on the books when the next constitution
was adopted, it was promoted to a constitutional right beyond
the legislature's power to diminish. The drafters of the 1938
constitution realized that it was not a very good idea to
constitutionalize all statutory jury rights by the routine use of
"heretofore used."' Accordingly, they ended the pattern of using
that formula and adopted the language quoted above. 24
Although the new article I, § 2 did not create any new
constitutional jury rights, it also did not eliminate any that had
previously achieved constitutional status by virtue of the
"heretofore used" clauses of previous constitutions, including,
presumably, the predecessor constitution of 1894. Recent
dictum of the New York Court of Appeals summarizes the
current wisdom: "Consequently, all cases afforded a jury trial
under the common law prior to 1777 and all cases to which the
Legislature extended a right to a jury trial prior to 1894 come
21 See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, I 4101.07, at 41-24 to 41-25.
2 See Wynehaner v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); see also Conderman v.
Conderman, 44 Hun 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 5th Dep't 1887) (concerning the
issue of adultery in a divorce case).
23 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1938 were forewarned of
this issue. See Lewis Mayers, The Constitutional Guarantee of Jury Trial in New
York, 7 BROOK L. REV. 180 (1937). Surrogate Sobel called their response, "half-
way." In re Luria, 313 N.Y.S.2d 12, 15 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1970) (stating that
the Constitutional Convention of 1938 did not grant constitutional status to
statutory jury rights enacted between 1894 and 1938).
24 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing for jury trial "in all cases in which it
has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision").
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within the present constitutional guarantee in article I, § 2." 25
Although the effect of the 1894 constitution will be revisited
at the end of this article, it is appropriate for now to discuss the
effect of the 1894 constitution as summarized by the Court of
Appeals. So the central issue may be stated simply: Was there
a statutory right to jury trial of equitable defenses to ordinary
legal actions prior to 1894? If so, it achieved constitutionally
guaranteed status by force of the 1894 constitution and,
therefore, could not have been taken away when the legislature
enacted the CPLR in 1963. On the other hand, if equitable
defenses only became triable by jury after 1894, e.g., when the
Civil Practice Act took effect in 1921, then pursuant to the
present constitution, the right remained statutory only and was
validly modified by CPLR 4101.
II. THE EQUITABLE DEFENSE IN NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
Prior to the merger of law and equity under the New York
Constitution of 1846 and the Code of Procedure of 1848 (Field
Code), there was no such thing as an equitable defense. During
the long period prior to the merger, if a defendant in a law
action alleged new matter that the common-law court would
recognize as sufficient to overcome the plaintiffs case, it of
course could be pleaded as an affirmative legal defense. If the
defendant, however, wished to raise some new matter that the
common-law court would not recognize, but which the
Chancellor would act upon, he was required to commence a
separate suit in equity to obtain an injunction against the
continuance of the action at law.
Recall the previous example of an action at law on a written
contract calling for payment of $1,000 for services rendered, in
which the defendant alleges that the true agreement was for
$100 and that the written contract was the product of a drafting
mistake. The common law court would not entertain this plea,26
so the defendant was driven to sue in equity for relief.27 If the
25 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State, 550 N.E.2d 919, 921 (N.Y. 1990) (dictum);
accord In re DES Mkt. Share Litig., 591 N.E.2d 226, 228-29 (N.Y. 1992) (dictum).
26 See Cheriot v. Barker, 2 Johns. 346, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (stating that
the court will not entertain the defense of mistake when the contract is otherwise
clear and explicit).
27 See Many v. Beekman Iron Co., 9 Paige Ch. 188, 196 (N.Y. Ch. 1841) (holding
that a bill in the chancery court is required to reform a written contract); Gillespie
v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585, 595 (N.Y. Ch. 1817) (Chancellor Kent) (noting that
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Chancellor, working without a jury, determined that the
petitioner's allegations were true, he would order the plaintiff to
discontinue his action, under penalty of contempt if he refused. 28
Although the facts found by the Chancellor did not render the
legal right invalid, his position was that they were of such
nature as to make it against good conscience for this plaintiff to
take advantage of them. A fragile peace with the common law
judges was maintained by the courteous fiction that the
Chancellor did not act "in rem," upon the legal right itself, but
"in personam," upon the conscience of the party asserting the
legal right.29 In sum, the facts found by the Chancellor were
courts of equity grant relief for claims of mistake and fraud). After the merger of
law and equity in 1846, actions for reformation brought in the supreme court were
tried by the court without a jury. See, e.g., Johnson v. Taber, 10 N.Y. 319 (1852)
(transferring a pending bill in equity, brought before the merger, to a (non-jury)
special term of the supreme court).
28 See F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW
1-11 (1909); WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 44-47 (1930); see also
FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 1.4-.5 (3d
ed. 1985) (providing a brief summary on the development of equity and its conflict
with the law courts).
29 The fiction had its true believers, as indicated by the following statement: "It
is only by a figure of speech that a person who has not the legal title to property can
be said to be the equitable owner of it. What is called equitable ownership or
equitable title or an equitable estate is in truth only a personal claim against the
real owner.. .. " C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING 210-11 (2d ed.
1883). These figures of speech and legal fictions are further elucidated in LON L.
FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 90-91, 129 n.64 (1967) (discussing the simultaneous
existence of legal and equitable rules on the same subject).
At early common law, the "fiction" had Langdellian reality. In a case decided in
1459, the Chancellor ordered a party to surrender a legally valid debt because it
would be unconscionable for him to enforce it. See J.R. v. M.P., Y.B, 37 Hen. VI, 13
(C.P. 1459), translated & reprinted in EDWARD D. RE & STANTON D. KRAUSS, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 24 (3d ed. 1992). The party refused and was jailed in
Fleet prison for contempt. See id. His action at law on the debt was nevertheless
allowed to proceed. See id.
When the Chancellor was closely identified with Royal prerogative, there came
a time in 1616 when the fragile truce broke down. The events stirred up by the
Watergate burglars produced no greater constitutional crisis than the judicial crisis
precipitated when Chief Justice Coke attempted to indict the subordinate chancery
officials responsible for issuing an injunction against a plaintiff in the law court.
This crisis placed the matter before the King who, after consulting with the highest
legal and political officials, upheld the lawfulness of the chancery's actions.
Thereafter, the equity rule would trump the legal rule when they differed. See
WALSH, supra note 28, §§ 5, 6. Later the same year, Coke was dismissed from his
place as Chief Justice of the Kings Bench. His compliant successor avowed that he
would not be "a heady judge.., busy in stirring questions, especially of
jurisdictions." 2 LORD CAMPBELL, THE LiVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 9
(1873). Lord Chancellor Ellesmere crowed over Coke's dismissal as "a Lesson to be
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defensive in substance, but required the defendant to bring a bill
in equity, thereby reversing the parties in the law action.
This awkward situation was occasionally alleviated when
the common-law court opened its eyes and adopted rules that
were previously recognized exclusively in equity. This
happened, for example, with regard to the issue of fraud in the
inducement of contracts. Although originating as an exclusively
equitable doctrine that warranted an injunction against the
fraudfeasor's action at law,30  most common-law courts
eventually accepted it as a valid defense in the law court, thus,
rendering resort to equity unnecessary.31 With regard to other
matters that remained the exclusive province of equity, however,
the argument continued to build upon the words of Pomeroy:
"Nothing could be devised more cumbrous than this double
litigation to enforce one right and to end one controversy."3 2
A. The Origin of the Field Code
Under the spur of the indefatigable David Dudley Field,
New York became the first jurisdiction to reform the old system
of separate courts of law and equity.33 Under the constitution of
1846, the old chancery court was abolished and its functions
transferred to the new supreme court, which was to have
"general jurisdiction in law and equity."34 The constitution of
learned of all, and to be remembered and feared of all that sit in Judicial places."
John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere Disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in
1616, 36 ILL. L. REV. 127, 138 n.44 (1941) (citations omitted). Of course, the
comparison to Watergate must be qualified. In 1616, the judge lost his job; in 1974,
the man who would be king lost his.
30 See James B. Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defences, 9 HARV. L.
REV. 49 (1895).
31 See Case v. Boughton, 11 Wend. 107, 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (allowing
failure of consideration as a defense to an action to recover on a sealed instrument);
Seaman v. Fonereau, 93 Eng. Rep. 1115, 1115 (KB. 1743) (holding that in an action
brought by an insured, the insurer can defend on the basis of fraud when obtaining
the insurance); see also Van Epps v. Harrison, 5 Hill 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843)
(stating that fraud is not a complete bar to an action brought for the contract price
if the buyer retains the goods); Crane v. Bunnell, 10 Paige Ch. 333, 341-42 (N.Y.
Ch. 1843) (refusing in a suit in equity to enjoin a pending law action on a contract
debt allegedly obtained by fraud, because the remedy at law was adequate).
32 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES: REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS
BY THE CIVIL ACTION § 26, at 46 (5th ed. 1929).
33 See Roscoe Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS 3, 3-16 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949).
34 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1846); see also In re Steinway, 53 N.E. 1103, 1104
(N.Y. 1899) (tracing the history of the New York Supreme Court).
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1846 further mandated that the legislature was to appoint three
commissioners "to revise, reform, simplify and abridge" court
practice. 35 The legislature complied, and the commissioners
responded expeditiously with their report and recommended
code on February 29, 1848.36 Later that year, the legislature
enacted the Code of Procedure, thereafter widely known as the
Field Code, after its principal sponsor.37
Neither the commissioners report nor the Field Code
temporized with the old dual system. The only acknowledgment
of the difference between law and equity came in the form of a
forceful negation:
The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and
the forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing, are.
abolished; and, there shall be in this state, hereafter, but one
form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private
rights and the redress or prevention of private wrongs, which
shall be denominated a civil action.38
No reference to law and equity was made in the sections
dealing with the contents of the complaint or answer, in which
the defendant was permitted to "set forth in his answer, as
many grounds of defence as he shall have."39
The same studied indifference to law and equity appears in
the sections dealing with the mode of trial of civil actions. The
key section on jury trial provided: "Whenever, in an action for
the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal
property, there shall be an issue of fact, it must be tried by a
jury [unless waived or referred]." 40 The commissioners' notes to
35 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (1846).
36 See N.Y. STATE COMMRS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, FIRST REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS: CODE OF PROCEDURE at v
(Albany 1848) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS].
37 See Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497; see also Mildred V.
Coe & Lewis IV. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field
Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942) (providing a summary of the process taken to
enact the Field Code).
38 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 62, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 510. This famous
statute was renumbered to § 69 as the result of sections added in 1849. See Act of
Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 69, 1849 N.Y. Laws 613, 630. The latter section number
will be used because that is the reference invariably cited by the cases. In
successive incarnations, it appears in the Code of Civil Procedure (1876) as § 3339;
in the Civil Practice Act (1921) as § 8; and in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 103(a) (McKinney 1990).
39 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 129, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 523 (renumbered to
§ 150 by Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 150, 1849 N.Y. Laws 613, 646).
40 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 208, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 536 (renumbered to
20001
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this section state:
A trial by jury is secured, by the constitution, to the parties, if
they require it, where there are issues of fact in the courts of
law, excepting only those where the trial involves the
examination of a long account. We propose an extension of the
right of trial by jury to many cases, not within the
constitutional provision. 41
What did the commissioners mean by the last sentence?
How did the new statute extend the right to jury trial to "many
cases" beyond the constitutional requirement, which, as they
noted, previously applied only to "issues of fact in the courts of
law" under the old system? Could they have intended to have
the statutory language taken literally? Could they have
intended the reference to the recovery of real property to include
actions for specific performance or constructive trust as well as
ejectment? Could they have intended the reference to personal
property to cover mandatory injunctions issued for that purpose,
as well as legal replevin? Could their reference to "money only"
have included money recoverable on grounds previously
equitable as well as on grounds previously legal? It is
interesting to read the commissioners' own introductory
comments to the Field Code article on trials. After discussing
the constitutional guarantee, and the old modes of practice in
courts of law and equity, the commissioners stated:
There remains then but the case of a trial by jury. And the
enquiry is narrowed down to this: can it be adopted in both
classes of cases? Or in other words, where an uniform mode of
pleading is used, will not the trial by jury be applicable as well
to that class of cases heretofore denominated equitable, as to
that denominated legal?42
After discussing the practical considerations, the
commissioners answered their own question: "We think,
therefore, we are warranted in concluding, that there is nothing
§ 253 by Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 253, 1849 N.Y. Laws 613, 666). Compulsory
reference, now governed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4317(b) (McKinney 1992), usually
involves a complaint presenting a long account, as to which there is no right to trial
by jury. See Steck v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 37 N.E. 1, 1 (N.Y. 1894). A
compulsory reference cannot be had where there is a right to a jury trial. See
Untermeyer v. Bernhauer, 11 N.E. 847 (N.Y. 1887); WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note
8, % 4317.08, at 43-42 to 43-43.
41 FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra note 36, at 185.
42 Id. at 179.
[74:1
20001 JURY TRIAL OF EQUITABLE DEFENSES
in the nature of the questions, nor in the number and variety of
them, which should prevent a uniform mode of trial in all cases,
whether they be such as have been heretofore denominated legal
or equitable."43
These comments make a convincing case that the framers of
the original Field Code had a more radical and far-reaching idea
of the fusion of law and equity than was ever acknowledged by
the courts, who interpreted the statutory provision for jury trial
as no more extensive than the constitutional guarantee.44
Actions for the recovery of money were held not to be subject to
jury trial if the grounds of recovery were historically equitable.45
The same treatment was also given to actions for the recovery of
real and personal property on equitable grounds.
46
B. How Were Equitable Defenses Tried Under the Field Code?
As noted above, the original Field Code of 1848 did not
expressly distinguish between types of defenses; nor did it say
43 Id. at 180.
4 See Emery v. Pease, 20 N.Y. 62, 64-65 (1859) (discussing whether an action
for accounting is equitable); McGurty v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 158 N.Y.S. 285,
287-88 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1916) (discussing the plaintiffs right to a jury trial
under the New York Constitution and under section 968 of the Code of Civil
Procedure); Moffat v. Mount, 17 Abb. Pr. 4, 5 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Gen. T. 1863) (stating
that a plaintiffs right to a jury trial in an "accounting" action is not absolute); see
also WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, S 4101.10, at 41-31 to 41-32.
45 See Woodruff v. Germansky, 135 N.E. 601, 602 (N.Y. 1922) (ruling on a land
vendor's action for specific performance); Dykman v. United States Life Ins. Co., 68
N.E. 362, 363 (N.Y. 1903) (concerning a suit to recover money paid for an annuity
on the grounds that the recipient was aware of the applicant's "unsound mental
condition"); Rindge v. Baker, 57 N.Y. 209, 219-21 (1874) (ruling on a land vendor's
action for specific performance); Crary v. Smith, 2 N.Y. 60, 62 (1848) (same); see
also Bensinger v. Erhardt, 77 N.Y.S. 577, 579-81 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1902)
(explaining the difference between an action at law for damages and an action in
equity for the price); In re De Stuer's Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 739, 743-45 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
County 1950) (surveying a land vendor's remedies against a defaulting purchaser);
see generally George L. Clark, Some Problems in Specific Performance, 31 HARV. L.
REV. 271 (1917).
46 See Flanigan v. Skelly, 85 N.Y.S. 4, 6 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1903) (holding that
a written decision is required in an action to rescind a deed induced by fraud); Karp
v. Twenty Three Thirty Ryer Corp., 56 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1945) (requiring a purchaser under a land contract to seek specific performance,
rather than ejectment), affid, 59 N.Y.S.2d 919 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1946); McDonald
v. Skinner, 209 N.Y.S. 219, 220-21 (Sup. Ct. Otsego County 1925) (same); Peck v.
Newton, 46 Barb. 173, 173 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1862) (precluding the remedy of
ejectment based upon plaintiffs equitable title).
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anything about the manner of trying different types of
defenses.47 The only reference to the mode of trial was in
connection with the type of action brought by the plaintiff. If it
was for the "recovery of money only, or of specific real or
personal property," a jury trial was required as to "an issue of
fact."48  An issue of fact was created "[ulpon a material
allegation of the complaint controverted by the answer[;] or,
[ulpon new matter in the answer controverted by the reply[;] or,
[u]pon new matter in the reply."49 No provision at all was made
for counterclaims.
Given the statutory mandate requiring jury trial of all
"issues of fact" in the enumerated actions under the Field Code,
the notion that issues of fact raised by affirmative defenses were
included in the mandate on a par with those raised by a simple
denial of the allegations in the complaint, appears to have been
too obvious to warrant any further discussion. 50 But what if,
under the new Field Code, the defendant attempted to raise as a
defense to a traditionally legal action, some issue that had
theretofore been investigated exclusively by the Chancellor?
Take, for example, an action of ejectment, which is triable by
jury. Suppose the defendant answered with a plea that the
deed, under which the plaintiff made his claim, was subject to
reformation because of a mistake in drafting, or that some other
traditionally equitable ground existed for overcoming the legal
title held by the plaintiff.
Clearly, if the positions of the parties were reversed, and the
claimant asserting equitable title came into court as a plaintiff
seeking a decree reforming or setting aside the deed, the case
would be tried by the court.51 Was all of the parol evidence
47 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
48 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 208, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 536 (renumbered to
§ 253 by Act of April 11, 1849, ch. 438, §253, 1849 N.Y. Laws 613, 666). This was
naturally understood to mean all issues of fact. See Hill v. McCarthy, 3 Code Rep.
49, 50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Madison County 1850).
49 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 205, 1848 N.Y. Laws, 497, 536 (renumbered to
§ 250 by Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 250, 1849 N.Y. Laws 613, 665-66).
50 When the Court of Appeals finally dealt with the question of whether an
affirmative defense in a legal action came within the constitutional guarantee
providing for a jury trial, it easily answered the question in the affirmative. See
Imbrey v. Prudential Ins. Co., 36 N.E.2d 651, 655 (N.Y. 1941) (finding that the
Appellate Division erred in directing a verdict against the plaintiff where the
plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial of "questions of fact" introduced by the
defendant).
51 See Imperial Shale Brick Co. v. Jewett, 62 N.E. 167 (N.Y. 1901).
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concerning mistake in contravention of the written deed to go
before the jury under the Field Code, because of the fortuitous
procedural circumstance that the legal title holder commenced
the action of ejectment and the equitable title claim was
asserted by way of a defense? This question was expressly
examined soon after the adoption of the Field Code in two cases.
In both cases, the lower courts concluded that the legislature did
not intend that equitable defenses could be set up in actions in
which juries were used.
In Crary v. Goodman,52 in a trial at circuit before a jury in
1850, the trial judge refused to admit the defendant's evidence of
mistake because "no equitable rights ... could be interposed as
a defense to the action, founded as it was on the legal title."53 A
judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the General Term
which held that the mode of trial of the ejectment action and the
claimed defense could not be had before the same court. "The
issue joined upon the allegations in the complaint touching the
plaintiff's title, was triable by a jury. That joined upon the
special matter set up in the answer, touching the equitable
interest of the defendant, was triable by the court."54 The
conclusion was that the two issues "are not in contemplation of
the code to be litigated in the same action."55
In Hill v. McCarthy,56 the same question was raised at
special term when a plaintiff seeking ejectment moved to strike
the defense of equitable title, founded upon a contract of
purchase. 57 As in the Crary case, the court noted that if the
holder of the alleged equitable title had come forward as a
plaintiff to perfect his title the "suit would have to be tried by
the Court without a jury.... The question arises then, shall the
defendant be permitted to do indirectly what he could not do
directly, and that is, demand to have his equity, or to divert a
52 9 Barb. 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. Cattaraugus County 1851), rev'd, 12 N.Y.
266 (1855).
53 Id. at 658.
54 Id. at 663. The Court noted that if the defendant had sued to establish his
equitable title, the case would have been tried by the court, because "[we are not to
suppose that the legislature entertained the absurd design of making the matter
presented by a complaint, triable by one tribunal, and the same matter, when
presented by an answer, triable by another." Id. at 664.
5 Id. at 664.
56 3 Code Rep. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Madison County 1850).
57 See id. at 49.
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legal title tried before a jury."5 8 The court recognized that all
issues of fact in the ejectment action would have to be sent to
the jury and went on to say that questions that arise in an
equity action "are quite unsuitable to the deliberations of a
jury," and that the defense should be excluded from plaintiffs
action and the defendant was left with a "plenary suit to divert
the plaintiffs legal title."59 The court nevertheless admitted
that "some judges have attained a different conclusion in
reference to just such a case,"60 and denied the motion to strike
so that the question could be raised at the trial at circuit and
reviewed by the Court of Appeals. 61
The reference in Hill to a difference of opinion is confirmed
by Burget v. Bissell,62 which allowed an equitable defense to an
action for trespass to chattels, and also acknowledged "some
contrariety of opinion, if not conflict of decision."63 The unsettled
character of the question was also noted, but not decided in
Barton v. Sackett.64
In accord with Hill, Cochran v. Webb, 65 permitted a
defendant in an ejectment action to commence a cross action
against the ejectment plaintiff seeking to establish and enforce
an equitable title. The cross action was permitted, because the
equitable relief could not be had in the ejectment action and:
for this reason among others, that under the code the equitable
issue requires a different mode of trial from that arising on the
allegations in the complaint. Issues which under the old system
were called legal are triable by jury; those that were
58 Id. at 50.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 51.
61 See id.
62 5 How. Pr. 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Yates County 1851).
63 Id. at 195.
64 3 How. Pr. 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1848). In Hunt v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 8 How. Pr. 416, 418-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1850), the
court stated, somewhat ruefully:
It is no longer necessary, in my judgment, to bring an action in the nature
of a suit in equity, to restrain proceedings in an action in the nature of a
suit at law. Whatever equities may exist between the parties which should
prevent a recovery by the plaintiff, of his legal claim, may now be set up as
a defence to the action, and the defendant is no longer put to his bill in
equity, for relief. This, I believe, is one of the advantages of the new
system, as claimed by its friends; and if it be an improvement, I am
disposed to give the system credit for it, as it certainly stands in need of
every thing that can be said in its favor.
65 4 Sand. 653 (N.Y.C. Super. Ct. Gen. T. 1851).
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denominated equitable are to be tried by the court.66
It is a fascinating historical fact that some judges were so
uncomfortable with the idea of placing equitable issues before
juries that some of the earliest reported cases concluded that
they could not be pleaded as defenses to "legal" actions at all.
Obviously, if this conclusion had been allowed to stand, one of
the principal objects of the merger of law and equity would have
been frustrated. A reading of these early Field Code cases
leaves no doubt that the prospect of using juries to try equitable
defenses to traditionally legal claims was at the heart of the
debate over whether they should be allowed at all. No one even
suggested that the equitable defense could be allowed, but not
tried by a jury.
In 1851, the Court of Appeals had the opportunity to
address the controverted question, in the case of Haire v.
Baker.67 In Haire, a parcel of land had been sold and conveyed
subject to an existing mortgage, the amount of which had been
deducted from the purchase price.68 By mistake, the mortgage
was not excepted in the deed from the covenant against
encumbrances. 69 The grantee suffered a foreclosure and then
commenced an action at law against the grantor for breach of
the covenant.70 Perhaps influenced by the decision in Hill,71 the
grantor did not plead the facts relating to the mistake in his
answer, but brought a separate action seeking equitable relief in
the form of an injunction against the grantee's action on the
covenant and requested that the deed be reformed to reflect the
parties' intent that the mortgage be excluded from the
covenant. 72 The case went to the Court of Appeals on a
judgment sustaining the grantee's demurrer to the grantor's
equity complaint.7 3 The demurrer was grounded in a Field Code
provision authorizing the dismissal of an action where another
action was pending between the same parties for the same
60 Id. at 654.
67 5 N.Y. 357 (1851).
68 See id. at 359.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 3 Code Rep. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Madison County 1850); see also supra notes
56-61 and accompanying text.
72 See Haire, 5 N.Y. at 361 -62.
73 See id at 362.
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cause.74 This, in turn, depended on whether the relief sought in
the second action simply duplicated the relief available in the
first.75 The judges unanimously agreed that the equitable
matter pleaded in the second action was available to the grantor
as a defense in the grantee's action on the covenant. After
describing the former practice under the dual system, the Court
said:
It is difficult to discover any good reason why the same defence
should not be admitted at law, in a suit brought to compel the
payment of money due upon the covenant; each suit is brought
to compel the performance of the covenant. The question of
mistake is one of fact simply, and as conveniently tried in the
one court as the other.76
Through this decision, which affirmed the right to raise as a
"defence at law,"77 an issue that had traditionally been
exclusively the province of the equity court, the "equitable
defense" was born. According to the majority, the separate
equity action was nevertheless allowed to proceed on the ground
that in the action at law, "the affirmative relief here sought,
could not have been attained, by the admission of such a
defence; an appropriate action and complaint for that purpose
were necessary."78
The posture in which the case reached the Court of Appeals
did not require a holding with respect to the mode of trial; The
question was simply whether a separate action in equity was
proper where there was an action at law pending. The court,
however, indicated that it was well aware of the debate
engendered by Hill79 and Crary,80 although it did not mention
74 See Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 122, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521-22
(renumbered to § 144(3) by April 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 144(3), 1849 N.Y. Laws 613,
645-46). This section listed "t]hat there is another action pending between the
same parties, for the same cause," as a ground for demurrer. Id.
75 See Hunt v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 8 How. Pr. 416, 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1850) (noting that since it was "clearly competent for the present
plaintiff to recoup his damages in the first action," a separate action would not be
permitted); Groshon v. Lyon, 16 Barb. 461, 465-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1853)
(noting that the rule antedated the Field Code); see generally DAVID D. SIEGEL,
NEW YORK PRACTICE § 262, at 391-93 (2d ed. 1991).
76 Haire, 5 N.Y. at 362.
77 Id. at 361.
78 Id. at 362.
79 3 Code Rep. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Madison County 1850); see also supra notes
56-61 and accompanying text.
80 9 Barb. 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1851), rev'd, 12 N.Y. 266
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either of these cases specifically. The court observed, with
reference to the facts injected into the case by the equitable
defense, that "[tihe question of mistake is one of fact simply, and
as conveniently tried in the one court as the other."8 ' The
reference to "one court" or "the other" was in one sense a
backward glance to the old separate courts of law and equity and
inferentially an endorsement of the mode of trial used at law as
a suitable and convenient manner of trying issues historically
tried in the courts of equity. Thus viewed, it was an outright
rejection of the concerns that led Hill and Crary to disallow
equitable defenses in actions triable by jury.
Haire's reference to "one court" or "the other" might also
have been meant to apply to the way the Field Code divided
judicial business among general terms, circuit courts, and
special terms.8 2 The general terms consisted of the judges from
each judicial district, usually in panels of three, who sat
periodically to hear appeals from the circuits and special
terms.8 3 It performed the intermediate appellate function that
the Appellate Division does today. The special terms were held
by a single judge for two purposes: to hear pre-trial motions in
cases that would later be tried at circuit; and to conduct non-
jury trials in cases excluded from the jury trial provisions of the
Code, i.e., equity cases.8 4 Issues of fact in the "legal" cases
enumerated in section 253 of the Code were tried at circuit,
where all issues of fact were tried by jury.85
(1855); see also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
81 Haire, 5 N.Y. at 362.
82 See N.Y. CODE PROC. §§ 18, 20, 21 (1849).
83 See N.Y. CODE PROC. §§ 18, 19 (1849).
84 See N.Y. CODE PROC. §§ 20, 254, 255 (1849); see also Hill, 3 Code Rep. at 50
(noting that although the Code abolished the distinction between actions at law and
suits in equity in terms of form, jurisdiction, and pleading, a distinction still
remains as to whether a jury must hear issues of fact in equity cases); Church v.
Freeman, 16 How. Pr. 294, 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1857) (holding that
under the Code, a party is entitled to a jury trial if a common law action is brought,
but in equity cases, a judge of the special term has discretion to proceed without ajury); M'Mahon v. Allen, 10 How. Pr. 384, 384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. New York County
1854) (exercising discretion and denying the use of a jury to decide issues in an
equity suit because of "the great accumulation of business on the circuit calendar,
and the great delays consequent thereon"); Wilson v. Forsyth, 16 How. Pr. 448, 448
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1857) (vacating an earlier order allowing a jury trial
to determine whether the defendant intended to "hinder, delay or defraud
creditors").
85 See Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, §§ 208, 210, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 536
(renumbered to §§ 253 and 255 by Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 438, §§ 253, 255, 1849
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The circuit courts functioned independently of the special
terms and were held at different times and sometimes in
different places.86 If a judge trying an equity case at special
term wanted an advisory jury determination of a crucial issue of
fact, he was required to interrupt proceedings and frame an
issue to be tried at the next convenient circuit.87 Conversely, if a
legal action triable at circuit also required a non-jury
determination of an equitable issue, such as a counterclaim,
depending on how the judge scheduled trial of the different
issues, the jury trial might have been postponed while awaiting
disposition of the equitable issue at the next special term.88 In
N.Y. Laws 613, 666); see also McCarty v. Edwards, 24 How. Pr. 236, 240 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Gen. T. Albany County 1861) (affihming the circuit court's judgment denying
plaintiffs request to have issues of fact in an equitable case heard by a jury).
86 See N.Y. CODE PROC. §§ 20-22 (1849). The original version of the Field Code
required special terms and circuit courts to be held at the same time and place. See
Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 19, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 501. This provision was
dropped in the 1849 version of the Field Code. In a report submitted on Dec. 31,
1849, suggesting an extensive revision that was never adopted, the Code
Commissioners stated:
Juries cannot be assembled for particular cases as they arise; they must be
drawn periodically, and in large or thinly populated counties, at
considerable intervals. So much the more reason is there, that when the
court does meet, and the jury are called together from different parts of
the county, all the business waiting for them should be dispatched.
N.Y. STATE COMM'RS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
Assembly Doc. No. 16, at vi (Albany 1850) (proposed draft); see also Coe & Morse
supra note 37, at 242 (noting that the final report of the Code Commissioners was
submitted to the Legislature on Dec. 31, 1848 and assigned Assembly document
number 16 of 1850).
87 See McClave v. Gibb, 52 N.E. 186, 187 (N.Y. 1898) (finding that when a party
is not entitled to a jury trial, but a jury is used to decide an issue of fact, "the
verdict is treated as an aid to the court to inform its conscience; but it is in no wise
bound thereby"); Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 12 N.E. 58, 60 (N.Y. 1887) (noting that
an equitable case may have issues of fact framed for jury consideration); Carroll v.
Diemel, 95 N.Y. 252, 255 (1884) (finding it proper for a trial judge to reject a jury's
finding of fact in an equity case); Vermilyea v. Palmer, 52 N.Y. 471, 475 (1873)
(holding that under the Code, a jury finding in an equity case has the same effect as
in the chancery court in that "[sluch a finding was used to inform the mind or
conscience of the court... [and] was ancillary to the judgment of the court"). The
proceeding was analogous to the former chancery practice of securing an advisory
opinion by framing a feigned issue for trial in the law court. See id.; Snell v. Loucks,
12 Barb. 385, 387-88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1852) (discussing the use of a "feigned
issue" proceeding).
88 This was the practice after the Throop Code superceded the Field Code in
1876 and counterclaims received a mode of trial independent of the main action. See
infra text accompanying note 157. Where an equitable counterclaim was interposed
in a legal action, jury trial of the legal action was usually stayed awaiting
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sum, trial judges did not make any findings of fact in cases tried
at circuit, and no jury was ever used at special term. Of course,
the courts acknowledged that these logistical problems could be
circumvented if a party waived its right to a jury trial,8 9 or
consented to a reference.90
Modern critics of the New York experience under the Code 9'
point out that the dilemma posed by the Hill and Crary cases
was a false one, because a middle course existed between the
extremes of trying all issues by jury and disallowing equitable
defenses altogether. In modern civil practice where legal and
equitable issues are blended, it is commonplace to let the jury
pass on the legal issues while the judge decides equitable issues,
such as equitable defenses, all in one trial and in one
courtroom. 92 Perhaps New York judges, in the early years of
Code practice, were not sufficiently imaginative in finding a way
out of the dilemma perceived in the earliest cases. The
historical fact, however, is that the Code language apparently
mandating jury trial of all issues of fact in the enumerated class
of cases, coupled with the mind-set fostered by the division of
labor between circuits and special terms, constituted a serious
impediment in the way of moving forward to the modern
practice of blending judicial and jury fact-finding. To the early
disposition of the counterclaim at special term. See, e.g., Gage v. Angell, 8 How Pr.
335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1853); Storandt v. Wakelee, 177 N.Y.S. 535
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1919); Brody, Adler & Koch Co. v. Hochstadter, 135 N.Y.S. 550
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1912); Goss v. C. S. Goss & Co., 111 N.Y.S. 115 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1908); Thomas v. Bronx Realty Co., 70 N.Y.S. 206 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1901).
One case took the sporting view of placing the plaintiffs legal claim on the jury
calendar for trial term and the defendant's equitable counterclaim on the special
term calendar. See Thomas, 70 N.Y.S. at 207. Because the two claims had crucial
issues in common, the court noted that whichever came to judgment first could be
res judicata on the other. See id.
89 See, e.g., MacKellar v. Rogers 17 N.E. 350 (N.Y. 1888); Manhattan Life Ins.
Co. v. Hammerstein Opera Co., 171 N.Y.S. 678 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1918).
90 See, e.g., Young v. Overbaugh, 39 N.E. 712 (N.Y. 1895); Hoppough v. Struble,
60 N.Y. 430 (1875); Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N.Y. 34 (1870); see also supra note 40.
91 See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 104-06
(2d ed. 1947); Walter Wheeler Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645, 650-53
(1923).
92 See Vinlis Constr. Co. v. Roreck, 260 N.Y.S.2d 245 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1965)
(illustrating the modern practice); Schoenfeld v. Atomic Prods. Corp., 350 N.Y.S.2d
730 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1973) rev'd, 323 N.E.2d 710 (N.Y. 1974) (same); Sherwood v.
Sherwood, 180 N.Y.S. 952 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1919) (same); Kaplan v. 2108-2116
Walton Ave. Realty Corp., 425 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1980) (same).
An early example in federal court is Judge Learned Hand's trial order in National
Aniline & Chemical Co. v. Arnhold, 298 F. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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judges, taking equitable defenses to legal actions away from the
jury would have entailed splitting the trial of a single case into
two separate forums, with the usual delays incident to the
different calendars and different times and places of
holding court.
In Haire v. Baker,93 it is apparent that the Court of Appeals
recognized that this would have had the practical effect of
reintroducing the evils of the dual court system, which the Code
sought to eliminate. If jury trial of equitable defenses was
perceived as an evil, it was the lesser evil in the minds of judges
interpreting the provisions of the new Code.
The decision in Haire v. Baker was soon followed by the
appeals in the contrasting cases of Dobson v. Pearce94 and Crary
v. Goodman,95 which went before the Court of Appeals in 1854
and 1855, respectively. In Dobson, where the trial judge allowed
an equitable defense to be tried before a jury, the court affirmed
the judgment and said that the "intent of the legislature is very
clear" that a defendant in one of the legal actions enumerated in
section 253 of the Code may set up "an equitable defence to
defeat a recovery upon it."96 The court defined equitable
defenses as including "all matters which would before have
authorized an application to the court of chancery for relief
against a legal liability, but which, at law, could not have been
pleaded in bar."97 In Crary, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's refusal to entertain the equitable defense with a
sweeping and elegant description of the merger of law and
equity.98
93 5 N.Y. 357 (1851).
94 12 N.Y. 156 (1854).
95 12 N.Y. 266 (1855).
9 Dobson, 12 N.Y. at 165.
97 Id. Judge Johnson's concurring opinion observed that "an equitable defence
to a civil action is now as available as a legal defence." Id. at 168.
98 See Crary, 12 N.Y. at 267-68. Judge Johnson, delivering the opinion of the
court, noted that:
[Since the enactment of the Code, which in terms abolishes the distinction
between actions at law and suits in equity, and prescribes but a single
form of civil action, the question in an action is not whether the plaintiff
has a legal right or an equitable right, or the defendant a legal or an
equitable defence against the plaintiffs claim; but whether, according to
the whole law of the land, applicable to the case, the plaintiff makes out
the right which he seeks to establish, or the defendant shows that the
plaintiff ought not to have the relief sought for.
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After the decisions of the Court of Appeals in Haire, Dobson,
and Crary, the availability of equitable defenses to legal actions
was laid to rest. Given the concerns about jury trials that gave
rise to the controversy over allowing equitable defenses, the use
of juries to try these defenses appears to have been laid to rest
as well. In referring to the jury trial section of the Field Code,
Professor Hinton observed: "Under this statute it was assumed
as too clear for question, that an equitable defence was to be
tried by jury as in [the] case of any other defence."99
Professor Hinton's statement appears to be borne out by the
reports of several cases decided under the Field Code in the
years following Haire, Dobson, and Crary. Equitable defenses
were litigated before juries without comment in New York
Central Insurance Co. v. National Protection Insurance Co.,'100
Chase v. Peck,10 1 and Pitcher v. Hennessey.10 2  Equitable
replications to legal defenses were also tried by juries in several
cases under the Field Code-as an "issue of fact" embraced
within the legal action. 0 3
Finally, the rule concerning the mode of trying defenses was
a two-way street. While equitable defenses were tried by a jury
if the underlying action was legal, legal defenses were tried by
9 E. W. Hinton, Equitable Defenses Under Modern Codes, 18 MICH. L. REV.
717, 724 n.19 (1920).
100 14 N.Y. 85 (1856).
101 21 N.Y. 581 (1860).
102 48 N.Y. 415 (1872).
103 See Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N.Y. 528 (1877); Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co.,
67 N.Y. 283 (1876). The practice continued under the Throop Code. See Wilcox v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 N.E. 153, 154 (N.Y. 1903); Grattan v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 80 N.Y. 281, 294 (1880) (permitting plaintiff to offer parol evidence by way
of reply if it is sufficient for equitable relief); Arthur v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 78
N.Y. 462, 467 (1879) (noting that evidence admissible in either law or equity maybe
offered in plaintiffs reply); Meyer v. Lathrop, 73 N.Y. 315, 322 (1878) (permitting a
plaintiff to offer evidence of mistake at trial in response to defendant's claim). If a
plaintiff sued to rescind a release on the ground of mistake, the action would clearly
be equitable and triable without a jury. See Burton v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 113 N.Y.S.2d 483 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1952); Stono v. Weiner, 10 N.Y.S. 828
(Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1st Dep't 1890), affd, 28 N.E. 653 (N.Y. 1891). But if the plaintiff
commenced a legal action to recover for personal injury, and the defendant pleaded
the release as an affirmative defense, the equitable reply thereto became triable by
jury as an issue of fact in the legal action. See Wood v. A. Hagaman & Co., 282
N.Y.S. 351 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1935); McGurty v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 158
N.Y.S. 285 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1916); House v. Scheffier, 27 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess County 1940) affd, 27 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1941). Under
CPLR 4101, an equitable replication to a legal defense is triable by the court. See
Rill v. Darling, 253 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1964).
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the court if the underlying action was equitable.10 4 For example,
if a fiduciary who was a defendant in an equitable action for an
accounting pleaded payment as a defense, the issue would be
tried by the court, not a jury.10 5
C. Equitable Defenses Under the Throop Code
The Code of Civil Procedure, called the Throop Code after its
principal sponsor, replaced the Field Code in 1876.106 With the
exception of a new section on the mode of trying counterclaims,
the Throop Code made no changes in the basic provisions
established by the Field Code. A new provision, however, was
added under section 970, which provided for stating issues for
jury trial as of right in cases not otherwise triable by jury.10 7 As
a result of section 970, we are able to catch a glimpse of how the
Court of Appeals viewed the trial of equitable defenses. In
104 See In re Baer, 41 N.E. 702 (N.Y. 1895) (action by purchaser of real property
to be relieved of obligation to purchase because of defect in property); Colman v.
Dixon, 50 N.Y. 572 (1872) (injunction action against use of trademark; defense that
plaintiff had no legal right to trademark); April M's Enter., Inc. v. Scott, 577
N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1991) (mortgage foreclosure; defense of fraud and
usury); Wurster v. Armfield, 90 N.Y.S. 699 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1904) (action for
specific performance; defense that defendant was mentally incompetent); King v.
Ross, 51 N.Y.S. 138 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1898) (action to quiet title by plaintiff
remains equitable under statute if defendant does not ask for affirmative relief);
Stephens v. Humphreys, 10 N.Y.S. 455 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1st Dep't 1890) (mortgage
foreclosure; defense of duress and fraud); Kaplan v. 2108-2116 Walton Ave. Realty
Corp., 425 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1980) (contract defenses in
mortgage foreclosure).
105 See Duffy v. Duncan, 35 N.Y. 187 (1866).
106 See Act of June 2, 1876, chs. 448-49, 1876 N.Y. Laws 1 (vol. 2). Extensive
amendments were made in 1877 and 1880. See Act of June 5, 1877, ch. 416, 1877
N.Y. Laws 442; Act of May 6, 1880, ch. 178, 1880 N.Y. Laws 1 (vol. 2).
107 See Act of June 2, 1876 ch. 448, § 970, 1876 N.Y. Laws 1, 183. A legal
counterclaim may be made in an equity action. Since another new provision, section
974, made counterclaims triable as if they were independent actions, see infra note
157 and accompanying text Section 970 was used to obtain a jury verdict on the
counterclaim. See Roslyn Heights Land & Imp. Co. v. Burrowes, 27 N.Y.S. 622 (Sup.
Ct. Gen. T. 2d Dep't 1894) (granting defendant's motion for a trial by jury to
consider his common law counterclaim in a mortgage foreclosure); Deeves v.
Metropolitan Realty Co., 26 N.Y.S. 23 (N.Y.C. C.P. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1893)
(holding that in a foreclosure action on a mechanic's lien, the defendant was
entitled to a jury trial on his counterclaim for damages), affd, 36 N.E. 739 (N.Y.
1894). Section 970 was also used if adultery was a contested issue in a divorce case.
See Lowenthal v. Lowenthal, 51 N.E. 995 (N.Y. 1898) (holding that it is not within
the court's discretion to deny the defendant a right to a jury trial on his
counterclaims); Cohen v. Cohen, 145 N.Y.S. 652 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1914) (holding
that the defendant had a right to a jury trial in an adultery case, even though the
motion was denied as untimely).
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Shepard v. Manhattan Ry. Co.,' 08 the defendant in an injunction
case sought to invoke section 970 to obtain a mandatory jury
verdict on damages incidental to the injunction. 109 Invoking the
equitable clean-up rule,110 the court rejected this attempt and
ruled that any jury verdict on such an issue would be
advisory."' In dictum illustrating the proper use of the section,
the court referred to a case "where, to a legal claim, an equitable
defense is interposed."12
Before turning to an examination of counterclaims, two
more cases decided on the eve of the 1894 constitution deserve
mention. These cases illustrate the accepted use of juries to try
108 30 N.E. 187 (N.Y. 1892).
109 See id.
110 Under the equitable clean-up rule, a court in the exercise of its equity
powers, and acting without a jury, may award legal relief incidental to the principal
equitable remedy. See, e.g., Jamaica Sav. Bank v. M. S. Invest. Co., 8 N.E.2d 493
(N.Y. 1937) (holding that a jury was not required where a deficiency judgment was
sought in a mortgage foreclosure); Lynch v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 29 N.E. 315
(N.Y. 1891) (holding that a court may award past damages in an action to enjoin a
continuous trespass). Similarly, a legal action does not cease to be triable by jury
because incidental equitable relief is sought. See Remsen v. New York, B. & M. B.
R. Co., 97 N.Y.S. 902, 903 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1906) (granting "incidental equitable
relief" in an ejection action if the sheriff was unable to remove an encroaching
structure); cf Syracuse v. Hogan, 138 N.E. 406 (N.Y. 1923) (requiring a jury trial
when the legal title of property was in dispute, even though there was a claim for
injunctive relief). The equitable clean-up rule, however, will not apply if the court
perceives two distinct claims, one legal and one equitable, both related to the same
transaction. As to the plaintiff, the result is the same as in an equitable clean-up.
Under a dubious waiver theory, by joining the legal claim with an equitable claim, a
plaintiff loses any right to jury trial of the legal claim. See Di Menna v. Cooper &
Evans Co., 115 N.E. 993, 994 (N.Y. 1917) ("The rule is fundamental that where a
plaintiff seeks legal and equitable relief in respect of the same wrong, his right to
trial by jury is lost."); Cogswell v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 11 N.E. 518, 519
(N.Y. 1887) (noting that "[wihere a plaintiff brings an action for both legal and
equitable relief in respect to the same cause of action.... the plaintiff by such
election submits to have the issues tried by the court"). The defendant, however,
retains the right to jury trial of the legal claim. See Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N.Y. 495
(1878); Vinlis Constr. Co. v. Roreck, 260 N.Y.S.2d 245 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1965).
The distinction between the two situations becomes blurry when the court detaches
the claim from its procedural context to determine its essential nature. See Hogan,
138 N.E. at 408 (stating that the court will decide what the main issue is and what
factors control the nature of the action); see also WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8,
4101.37, at 41-75 (discussing the Hogan case).
M See Shepard, 30 N.E. at 188.
112 Id. at 189. Although this dictum indicates that the court thought that
equitable defenses to legal actions were triable by jury, it is not clear why the
framing of an issue under the new section 970 was a procedural mechanism
necessary to obtain the jury's verdict on the defense. It does not appear to have
been used for that purpose in subsequent cases.
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equitable defenses and also the rule's shortcomings. In
Southard v. Curley,113 the plaintiff sued for damages for breach
of a contract by which the defendants agreed to purchase a
building-a legal action. 114  In their answer, the defendants
alleged that the true agreement was for an option to purchase
the building.115 They further alleged that the written contract
was the product of a mistake and should be reformed.116 The
case was tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict for the
defendants. 117 The plaintiff appealed on the ground that the
evidence of mistake was insufficient as a matter of law and that
the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding
defendants' burden of proving mistake beyond a reasonable
doubt.118 The court found that there was legally sufficient
evidence to support the verdict, 119  thereby treating it as
conclusive, subject to the correctness of the instruction to the
jury. There was no suggestion that the verdict was merely
advisory. Judge Parker's opinion exhaustively surveyed the
various forms of expression that had been used in texts and
cases to describe the heightened burden of proof on one seeking
reformation of a written contract, 120 and rejected the argument
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not required.
Nowhere does the opinion criticize the practice of allowing a lay
jury to hear parol evidence of mistake to change a written
contract. Nor does the opinion exhibit any lack of confidence in
the jury's ability to appreciate the fine shadings of meaning in
the many formulations of the appropriate burden of proof. In its
lack of what Karl Llewellen called "situation-sense,"121 the case
perfectly illustrates the high formal style ascendant in the late
nineteenth century.
113 31 N.E. 330 (N.Y. 1892).
114 See id. at 330.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 332.
120 See id. at 331-32.
121 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
60-61 (1960). Llewellyn describes "situation-sense" as indicating "the type-facts in
their context and at the same time in their pressure for a satisfying working result,
coupled with whatever the judge or court brings and adds to the evidence, in the
way of knowledge and experience and values to see with, and to judge with." Id. at
60.
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In Kirchner v. New Home Sewing Machine Co.,122 there was
a jury trial of a tort case in which the defendant pleaded a
general release as an affirmative defense. 12 This, of course, was
a run-of-the-mill legal complaint and legal defense. The
defendant persuaded the trial judge to allow evidence of prior
negotiations to show that the release did not extend to the
plaintiffs cause of action.124 The trial judge also instructed the
jury that the release did not cover causes of action unknown to
the releasor.12 The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for
the plaintiff based on the jury's verdict, holding that the trial
judge's rulings and instructions were inconsistent with the rule
that protected solemn written contracts from alteration through
parol evidence. 126 The opinion went on, however, to explain how
the plaintiff might obtain relief on a new trial:
[The release] has been set up and proven as an affirmative
defense, and the plaintiff, under section 522 of the [Throop]
Code, is to be deemed to have controverted the defense by
traverse or avoidance, as the case may require, and he may
have the benefit of whatever evidence he can produce to sustain
such traverse or avoidance. Meyer v. Lathrop, 73 N.Y. 315. If
the plaintiff can show that by mutual mistake of the parties, or,
by what is its equivalent, a mistake on his part and fraud on
the part of his adversary, the present cause of action is
embraced in the release, contrary to the intent of the parties, or
contrary to his intent in case fraud is proven, he is entitled to
an instruction to the jury to the effect that the release does not
bar his right to recover. Generally speaking, whatever proofs
would be regarded as sufficient to enable the plaintiff to
maintain an action for the reformation of the release, so as to
except from its provisions the demand in suit, would be
available to him in this action by way of avoidance of its
terms. 127
Kirchner is a fascinating case. On the one hand, it is based
on impeccable logic derived from prior cases and statutes. Just
as defenses, whether legal or equitable, were triable according to
the character of the action, so too were replications to defenses.
31 N.E. 1104 (N.Y. 1892).
123 See id. at 1105.
124 See id.
1z See id.
Im See id. at 1107.
127 Id. at 1106-07.
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Joinder of issue under either form of pleading presented an
"issue of fact" in the action. 12 Further, the statute referred to in
the quotation from Kirchner was the law from the earliest days
of code practice, and remains the law today. The law states that
a plaintiff does not have to plead to new matter in a defense.
Rather, the law supplies the reply and evidence in traversal or
avoidance is admissible accordingly. 129 There are many cases,
usually tort cases, in which the defendant pleads the affirmative
legal defense of a release and at trial the plaintiff seeks to avoid
the release with evidence of fraud or mistake. Even when the
evidence in contravention of the release was by way of avoidance
on equitable grounds, the cases prior to the CPLR acknowledged
the plaintiffs right to trial by jury.130
On the other hand, it is hard to defend on policy grounds the
formalistic distinction by which parol evidence is inadmissible at
law to attack a written contract such as a release, but is
admissible in the same courtroom before the same jury on a
theory of rescission or reformation for mistake. According to the
late Professor McCormick, in his famous article, 131 the primary
purpose of the parol evidence rule is to control the unruly
propensities of lay juries. 13 2 If this is true, then the holding of
the Kirchner case seems to exalt form over substance. As
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed many years after
Kirchner in excluding parol evidence contradictory of terms in
an insurance policy:
Of course if the insured can prove that he made a different
128 See, e.g., McGurty v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 158 N.Y.S. 285, 287 (App.
Div. 4th Dep't 1916); Warner v. Star Co., 147 N.Y.S. 803 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1914);
Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 N.Y. 281 (1880); Mandeville v. Reynolds,
68 N.Y. 528 (1877); Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 283 (1876).
129 See N.Y. CODE PROC. § 168 (1849); N.Y. CODE Civ. PROC. § 522 (1876); N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. ACT § 243 (1921); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3011 (1991) (discussing various types of
pleadings); see also Wilcox v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 N.E. 153, 154 (N.Y. 1903)
(explaining that a plaintiff was not required to appeal to a court of equity for relief
against the deed, but a plaintiff could show fraud to defeat the claim); Arthur v.
Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 78 N.Y. 462, 467 (1879); Meyer v. Lathrop, 73 N.Y. 315,
322 (1878); Bates v. Rosekrans, 37 N.Y. 409 (1867); Sullivan v. Traders' Ins. Co., 62
N.E. 146 (N.Y. 1901) (approving the plaintiffs reply over the dissent's description of
the procedure as an indirect amendment to a legal complaint through the addition
of an equitable cause of action).
130 See cases cited supra note 128.
131 Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for
Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365 (1932).
132 See id. at 366.
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contract from that expressed in the writing he may have it
reformed in equity. What he cannot do is to take a policy
without reading it and then when he comes to sue at law upon
the instrument ask to have it enforced otherwise than according
to its terms. The court is not at liberty to introduce a short cut
to reformation by letting the jury strike out a clause. 133
In Franklin Fire Insurance Co. v. Martin,134 which was
decided in 1878, New Jersey's highest court anticipated Justice
Holmes' view and held that parol evidence of mutual mistake in
filling out an application for insurance was not admissible in an
action at law upon the policy.135 Of course, such a decision was
predictable in a state that kept the law and equity courts
separate until 1947.136 The New Jersey case is interesting
because the plaintiff cited several New York cases in support of
admitting the evidence of mutual mistake. The court declined to
follow the New York cases, however, stating that they "are the
decisions of courts in which the legal and equitable jurisdictions
are so blended that the functions of a court of equity have been
transferred to the jury box."137
The New York Court of Appeals must have been stung by
the criticism in Franklin because it responded to the case by
name one year later. In Flynn v. Equitable Life Insurance Co., 138
the court affirmed a plaintiffs judgment on a life insurance
policy entered on a jury verdict despite materially false answers
to questions on the written application concerning the
applicant's medical history.139 The trial court had admitted
parol evidence that the insured gave truthful answers to the
insurer's agent, who filled in incorrect data on the application
without the knowledge of the applicant.140 In holding the
insurer estopped from forfeiting the policy, the court's opinion,
written by the Chief Judge, cited the Franklin case and
commented:
13 Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, 237 U.S. 605, 610 (1915).
134 40 N.J.L. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1878).
135 See id. at 580-81.
136 See generally Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, The Right to a Civil
Jury Trial in New Jersey, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1461 (1995). Post merger cases in
New Jersey continue to reserve equity issues for decision by the court. See, e.g.,
Asbestos Fibres, Inc. v. Martin Lab., Inc., 12 N.J. 233 (1953).
137 Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 40 N.J.L. at 579.
138 78 N.Y. 568 (1879).
139 See id. 576-78.
140 See id. at 575.
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Many of the distinctions between courts of law and equity as to
the admission of evidence have necessarily become obliterated
when these jurisdictions are blended, and are exercised by the
same tribunal. In principle, written instruments can have no
greater sanctity in courts of law than in courts of equity, and
when authority exists for administering justice in either court
there is no sound reason why the evidence for that purpose
should not be received in either court.141
The court concluded that it was not necessary to first sue to
reform the policy and then sue again to enforce it.142 Rather, in
a single action, the plaintiff could recover the proceeds based on
an instruction, that on the evidence, the jury might find the
insurer estopped from forfeiting the policy.143 Given that the
criticism from across the river was based on the way New York
used juries to try equitable issues, the Chief Judge's opinion
must be viewed as a reaffirmation of the New York practice.
Therefore, the court was sanctioning the use of juries to try
equitable issues when they arise as defenses or replications in
the legal actions enumerated in section 253 of the Field Code' 44
and section 968 of the Throop Code,145 which was newly enacted
when Flynn was decided. From this time forward, no New York
case ever denied that all defenses were triable in the same
manner as the main action. The uneasiness regarding the use of
juries to try equitable issues coalesced around the proper scope
of counterclaims.
III. DEFENSES, COUNTERCLAIMS, AND JURY TRIAL
Although the Field Code as originally enacted in 1848
provided that a "defendant may set forth in his answer, as many
141 Id. at 578. It is interesting that in 1879, judges were still referring to "either
court." Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 81.
142 See Flynn, 78 N.Y. at 578.
143 See id.
144 See N.Y. CODE PROC. § 253 (1852).
145 See Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 448, § 968, 1876 N.Y. Laws 1, 183, amended by
Act of June 5, 1877, ch. 416, § 217, 1877 N.Y. Laws 442, 462. As originally enacted,
section 968 of the Throop Code stated that "[i]n each of the following actions, an
issue of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived, or a reference is
directed: 1. An action to recover a sum of money only. 2. An action of ejectment; for
dower; for waste; for a nuisance; or to recover a chattel." Id. The provision for jury
trial of questions concerning adultery in a divorce case originally found under § 253
of the Field Code, N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 253 (1852), was retained but transferred
to section 1757 of the Throop Code, Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 448, § 1757, 1876 N.Y.
Laws, and was later transferred to CIV. PRAC. ACT § 1149 (1921).
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grounds of defence as he shall have,"146 it contained no
mechanism by which a defendant could counterattack and
obtain affirmative relief against the plaintiff. Although the
judges in Haire v. Baker 47 were unanimous in affirming the
right of the grantor to raise an equitable defense that defeated
the plaintiffs claim for damages for breach of covenant, the
majority held that the affirmative relief sought, reformation of
the deed, was not available to the grantor as a defendant in the
first action.148 Consequently, the court overruled the demurrer
to the grantor's separate action seeking such affirmative
equitable relief.149
As a result of the court's decision in Haire, the legislature in
the following year, 1852, hastened to confirm the positive aspect
of the court's holding by expressly providing for equitable
defenses. The legislature also purported to correct the negative
aspect of the court's holding, the lack of any procedure for a
defendant to obtain affirmative relief against the plaintiff. The
original section 129 of the Field Code, 150 which was subsequently
renumbered section 150,151 was amended to read: "The
defendant may set forth by answer, as many defences and
counter-claims as he may have, whether they be such as have
been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or both."152
By this 1852 amendment, the Field Code took the shape
that remained essentially unchanged through the Code of Civil
Procedure in 1876 (Throop Code) and the Civil Practice Act of
1921,153 up until the CPLR in 1963.154 Counterclaims, however,
were introduced into the statutory scheme without reference to
146 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 129, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 523.
147 5 N.Y. 357 (1851).
148 See id. at 362.
149 See id.
150 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 129, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 523.
151 Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 150, 1849 N.Y. Laws 613, 646.
152 Act of Apr. 16, 1852, ch. 392, § 150 1852 N.Y. Laws 651, 654 (new language
italicized). The judgment section of the Field Code was also amended to provide
that the judgement "may grant to the defendant any affirmative relief to which he
may be entitled." N.Y. CODE PROC. § 274 (1852).
153 Section 150 of the Field Code was restated in N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 507
(1876) and CIV. PRAC. ACT. § 262 (1921).
'r N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3018 (McKinney 1991). This statute deals with responsive
pleadings, and makes no mention of law and equity. See id. The only reference is
found in section 4101 of the C.P.L.R., by which equitable defenses and
counterclaims are triable by the court even when set up in jury actions. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4101 (McKinney 1992).
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the mode of trying them. If any legislator gave thought to the
question, of which there is no evidence, it was probably assumed
that counterclaims would be treated as independent actions for
the purpose of determining the right to jury trial. After all, in
order to constitute a counterclaim, the pleading must show a
cause of action in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff
that could have been brought as a separate action. 155 Prior to
the 1852 amendment, one court observed that equitable defenses
were allowed in legal actions, but equitable counterclaims were
not because of the jury trial problems that counterclaims would
cause. The court said:
It is settled, I believe, that an equitable defence may now be set
up in the answer in an action purely legal, ejectment, for
instance; but it is clear that in such an action the answer can
not go beyond a defence and insert facts with a view to
affirmative relief, for the conclusive reason that the mode of
trial would be different. The defence must be tried by a jury;
the claim to relief by the court. 156
This division of function between court and jury was made
explicit in 1876 when the Code of Civil Procedure (Throop Code)
replaced the Field Code. A new rule was created by section 974,
which provided:
Where the defendant interposes a counterclaim, and thereupon
demands an affirmative judgment against the plaintiff, the
mode of trial of an issue of fact, arising thereupon is the same,
as if it arose in an action, brought by the defendant, against the
plaintiff, for the cause of action stated in the counterclaim, and
demanding the same judgment.' 57
155 The 1852 amendment to section 150 of the Field Code required the newly
minted counterclaim to be a cause of action in favor of the defendant against the
plaintiff, where "a several judgment might be had in the action." Act of Apr. 16,
1852, ch. 392, § 150, 1852 N.Y. Laws 651, 654.
156 Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145, 153 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
157 Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 448, § 974, 1876 N.Y. Laws 1, 184 (vol. 2). Section
974, as first enacted in 1876, authorized the court to conduct simultaneous trials of
legal and equitable cross-claims. This ran against the grain of the traditional
division of labor between the special term and the circuit courts (later called trial
terms). Therefore, the legislature removed the innovation in the 1877 amendment,
leaving the section the way it reads in the above text. See Act of June 5, 1877, ch.
416, § 222, 1877 N.Y. Laws 44, 462. Montgomery Throop lamented the change in
the amended 1877 Code. See Montgomery H. Throop et al., Introduction to N.Y.
CODE PROC. (1877). The new section 974 was complemented by section 970. See
supra text accompanying notes 108-12. These provisions were designed to provide a
procedural mechanism for getting a jury verdict for a legal counterclaim imposed in
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When a shorthand reference to section 974 is convenient, it
will be called the "the counterclaim statute."158
The fact that the legislature in 1876 would single out
counterclaims for their own mode of trial, separate from the
main action, confirms the evidence already reviewed. This leads
to the logical conclusion that issues of fact raised by defenses,
including equitable defenses, were triable in the same manner
as the facts alleged in the complaint. Many years later, Judge
Charles E. Clark argued that the existence of the counterclaim
statute did not justify a negative inference concerning how
defenses were to be tried. 59 He disapproved of the way New
York courts handled the trial of equitable defenses and was
instrumental in drafting the federal rules under which they are
tried by the court.160 Nevertheless, in this instance, the wish
an equity action. Section 969, in providing for a trial by the court of any issue of fact
for which a trial by jury was not expressly provided, covered trial of equitable
counterclaims set up in legal actions. See Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 448, § 969, 1876
N.Y. Laws 1, 183. The apprehension expressed in the quotation from Wooden v.
Waffle, see supra text accompanying note 156, concerning simultaneous trial of jury
and non-jury issues was usually avoided by sending equitable claims to be tried at
special term without a jury, and legal claims to be tried at trial term with a jury.
See, e.g., Herb v. Metropolitan Hosp. & Dispensary, 80 N.Y.S. 552 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1903) (granting the defendant's motion for a jury trial to decide a
counterclaim for damages in a mortgage foreclosure action); Southack v. Central
Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S. 1122 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1901); Roslyn Heights Land & Imp.
Co. v. Burrowes, 27 N.Y.S. 622 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 2d Dep't 1894).
158 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 424 (1921). The counterclaim statute was carried
forward in the CPLR in a roundabout fashion. As previously described, the CPLR
provides that equitable counterclaims are to be tried by the court. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.
4101 (McKinney 1992). Legal counterclaims are recognized through the back door,
so to speak, in section 4102(c) which is entitled "Waiver" and states that a party
does not waive a trial by jury "of the issues of fact arising upon a counterclaim,
cross-claim or third party claim, by asserting it in an action in which there is no
right to trial by jury." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4102(c) (McKinney 1992). Presumably, the
right which is not waived under section 4102(c) arises by inference under section
3019(d) which states that "[a] cause of action contained in a counterclaim or a cross-
claim shall be treated, as far as practicable, as if it were contained in a complaint."
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3019(d) (McKinney 1991). Thus, by a combination of sections, it can
be concluded that a legal counterclaim (or cross-claim) enjoys the right of trial by
jury, even when asserted in an equitable action.
169 See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 105 (2d
ed. 1947) (stating that the existence of the counterclaim statute "hardly justifies the
reading into it of a negative opposite of more extensive character").
160 See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a)-(d) (preserving the right to trial by jury under the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution and outlining procedures for demanding
trial by jury, specification of issues, and waiver of trial by jury); see also CHARLES E.
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 97-98 (2d ed. 1947) (stating
that the Federal Rules "[preserve] trial by jury as given by the Seventh Amendment
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appears to be father to the thought. It is hard to believe that so
exhaustive, indeed prolix, a codification of civil practice as the
Throop Code would deliberately enact a new provision dealing
with jury trial of counterclaims while at the same time saying
nothing about how defenses were to be tried. The only
explanation for this omission is that it was perfectly obvious to
the codifiers that the existing provisions governing jury trial of
enumerated actions also applied to all defenses that might be
raised in those actions. The only reasonable conclusion is that
the sections on jury trial of any "issue of fact" in the enumerated
legal actions under the Throop Code,161 together with the newly
enacted counterclaim statute, gave seamless coverage of all jury
trial rights.162
The introduction of express statutory authority for a distinct
mode of trial for counterclaims stimulated some maneuvering by
defendants who wanted to avoid the mode of trial dictated by the
plaintiffs action. This article is concerned primarily with the
relation between equitable defenses and counterclaims in legal
actions, but it should be noted that the converse situation was
also presented. Thus, a defendant in an equity case who wanted
his legal issue tried by a jury might try to plead it as a
counterclaim, rather than as a defense. If the court was
convinced that the defendant's answer raised a genuine
counterclaim, a jury would try the legal issue.163 If, however, the
to the Constitution... [and provide for] demand and waiver [of trial by jury]"). For
an acknowledgement of Judge Clark's contributions to the Federal Rules, see Henry
P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System: 1922-1947, in
31 F.R.D. 307, 513 (1963) (noting that Judge Clark "was responsible for the
preparation of the drafts of rules and the notes on them" and recognizing "[tihe
comprehensiveness and accuracy of the research conducted by him"); see also
Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914 (1976). Judge Clark had a possessive attitude toward
the Federal Rules, which he regarded as his brainchild, and had little patience with
the New York system. His "prickly, combative personality" in the cause of
procedural reform inspired Learned Hand to call him "the GLAPP," short for "the
Greatest Living Authority on Practice and Procedure." GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 521-22 (1994).
161 See Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 448, § 968, 1876 N.Y. Laws 1, 183 (stating that
issues of fact which must be tried by a jury include "1. An action to recover a sum of
money only. 2. An action of ejectment; for dower; for waste; for a nuisance; or to
recover a chattel").
162 See N. Y. CODE PROC. § 253 (1849) (stating that issues of fact which must be
tried by a jury include "action[s] for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or
personal property").
163 See Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 115 N.E. 993, 995 (N.Y. 1917) (noting
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court regarded the new matter raised in the answer as a
defense, the defendant would be locked into the non-jury mode of
trial dictated by the plaintiffs action.16
Ejectment cases presented particularly vexing problems
with respect to defenses and counterclaims. Even allowing for
the recordability of judgments in the land title records, absent a
formal decree of reformation, a judgment in favor of a defendant
in an ejectment action might be viewed by title examiners as
less than conclusive evidence of title-unlike a judgment in the
plaintiffs favor for ejectment. This must have been in the minds
of the judges in the early case of Haire v. Baker,165 in which the
majority allowed a second action for reformation of a deed
notwithstanding the pendency of an ejectment action in which
an equitable defense could have been set up.166 In any event, in
that when a counterclaim raises an "independent cause of action... [it is] triable
by jury as of right"). Just as equitable replications to legal defenses were embraced
within the issues of fact triable as dictated by the plaintiffs action, see supra note
103, by a parity of reasoning, an equitable replication to the plaintiffs reply to a
legal counterclaim was triable by jury. See, e.g., Tornamme v. Tornabe, 153
N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956). In Tornamme, the plaintiff sued in
equity to cancel a deed for fraud. See id. at 824-25. The defendant counterclaimed
for partition on the basis of his deed, which was an issue triable by jury. See id. at
825. The plaintiff replied to the partition counterclaim with an equitable defense
thereto. See id. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial of the
issue raised by his equitable reply to the legal counterclaim. See id. at 826.
164 See Cook v. Jenkins, 79 N.Y. 575, 578 (1880) (finding, in a controversy
concerning the dissolution of a co-partnership, that "[tihese matters present no
counter-claim which shows a separate and distinct cause of action which entitles
the defendant to a trial by jury"); City Real-Estate Co. v. Foster, 60 N.Y.S. 577, 577
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1899) (finding, in a case which is questionable on its facts, that
in a foreclosure action, the defendant's counterclaim must establish a cause of
action which could result in an affirmative judgement against the plaintiff in order
to have the issues of fact tried by a jury). In Di Menna, Judge Cardozo, in approving
jury trial of a legal counterclaim in an equitable action, was careful to note that it
"was more than a counterclaim in name only." 115 N.E. at 995.
165 5 N.Y. 357 (1851).
166 See id., at 362; see also supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text
(discussing the court's holding in Haire). In Cavalli v. Allen, 57 N.Y. 508, 508-09
(1874), in answer to an ejectment action, the defendant claimed legal title to the
disputed land. In addition, the defendant sought a decree of specific performance
alleging that he had a prior contract of purchase from plaintiffs predecessor in title,
the equities of which plaintiff was subject to because of notice. See id. at 513-14.
The trial judge apparently treated defendant's answer as a counterclaim and in an
innovative procedure, three years before the enactment of section 974 of the Throop
Code, allowed the issue concerning legal title to be determined by the jury, as he
decided the equitable issue himself. Id. at 509. Unfortunately, the trial judge was
incorrect and was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which did not comment on the
mode of trial. Id. at 517. The innovative procedure did not catch on and the habitual
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several reported cases involving an ejectment, the defendant's
request for reformation was tried on a reference. 167 In other
cases, when an affirmative decree of reformation was
unavailable because a necessary party, such as a common
grantor, was absent, the defendant was allowed to set up an
equitable defense before a jury.1 68  One particularly clear
division of labor between the circuit courts (subsequently, trial terms) and special
terms continued well into the twentieth century. See Wasserman v. Taubin, 114
N.Y.S. 447, 448-49 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1908) (Gaynor, J., concurring) (stating that
section 974 of the Throop Code refers to "the 'mode' of trial, and not the place, or
particular part or subdivision of the court, or court room, in which the trial is to be
tried"). In 1915, the Court of Appeals addressed the question for the first time,
chastising the Appellate Division for failing to recognize the possibility of trying a
legal complaint and an equitable counterclaim at the same time and in the same
courtroom. See City of New York v. Matthews, 108 N.E. 80 (N.Y. 1915). In Di
Menna, an erroneous decision by the lower courts that both the claim and
counterclaim were triable by jury as of right gave Judge Cardozo of the New York
Court of Appeals, a fortuitous opportunity to describe how parts of a jury verdict
may be treated as conclusive and other parts as only advisory. See 115 N.E. at 994-
95. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals provided additional insight regarding its
preference for the jury verdict on common issues. See id. at 994-95.
167 See, e.g., Young v. Overbaugh, 39 N.E. 712 (N.Y. 1895); Hoppough v.
Struble, 60 N.Y. 430 (1875); Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N.Y. 34 (1870); Siemon v.
Schurck, 29 N.Y. 598 (1864). The reference in all of these cases was necessarily by
consent of the parties. Nothing in an answer could make a case referable by
compulsion if the complaint stated a legal claim. See Snell v. Niagra Paper Mills, 86
N.E. 460, 461 (N.Y. 1908) (holding that both parties must consent to a reference
and refusing to grant a reference based on the defendant's answer which
established a counterclaim requiring a "long examination of documents");
Untermeyer v. Bernhauer, 11 N.E. 847, 848 (N.Y. 1887) (denying plaintiffs motion
for a reference in an action to recover damages for breach of contract). The
Untermeyer court also noted that the request for a reference must be made in the
original complaint. See id. at 848. The court concluded" '[i]f the action is a referable
one, the answer cannot make it non-referable,' and on the same principle, if the
action is non-referable, a counter-claim set up in the answer cannot make it
[referable]." Id. (citation omitted).
68 See Crary v. Goodman, 12 N.Y. 266 (1855); Webster v. Bond, 9 Hun 437
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1876). Other cases refused to allow the ejectment
defendant to set up an equitable defense where interested third parties, such as a
common grantor, were not before the court. See, e.g., Hicks v. Sheppard, 4 Lans.
335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1871); Cramer v. Benton, 60 Barb. 216 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1871). This was a harsh rule for defendants because they would
often find it difficult to bring in such parties. The rule was that "a person bringing a
legal action cannot be compelled to sue any person except such as he may elect to
sue." Chapman v. Forbes, 26 N.E. 3, 5 (N.Y. 1890). This limitation influenced some
courts to allow the equitable defense between the parties even though non-parties
would be necessary for a decree reforming a deed. See, e.g., Glacken v. Brown, 39
Hun. 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1886); Webster v. Bond, 9 Hun. 437 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1876); see also Deiches v. Western Dev. Co., 142 N.Y.S.
932 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1913) (holding that in an action at law, a defendant cannot
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statement is found in the pre-1894 case of Glacken v. Brown:169
"It is not necessary to reform the deeds in order to do justice
between the parties. Such reformation would require an action
in which the railroad company [a non-party] should also be a
party."170 In reversing the trial court's exclusion of evidence of
mistake in the deeds, the court commented on the correct mode
of trying the issue, stating that:
While the action is legal and the defense equitable, the method
of trial is as if the action were wholly legal. We conclude,
therefore, that the defendant was entitled to have submitted to
the jury the questions of fact, arising upon the testimony in his
behalf, substantially as he requested.171
A. Drawing the Line Between Equitable Defenses and
Counterclaims
From the very beginning of Code Practice in 1848, there
were essentially two divergent views of how to characterize
equitable issues raised by a defendant in a legal action-they
could be treated as either a defense or a counterclaim. These
two approaches were summarized by Professor (later Judge)
Charles E. Clark in 1926.172 Assume a case in which a plaintiff
sues for services provided under a written contract that calls for
payment at the rate of $10.00 per unit. The defendant answers
with an allegation that the true agreement was for $1.00 per
unit and that the written contract contains a typographical
mistake and should be reformed.173 One view, called "analytical"
by Judge Clark, would say that the new matter pleaded by the
defendant is sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs claim without
compel a plaintiff to bring third parties into the action by raising an equitable
counterclaim, but noting that a defendant can compel a plaintiff to bring third
parties into the action by raising an equitable defense).
169 39 Hun. 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1886).
170 Id. at 298.
171 Id. (citation omitted); accord De Forest v. Walters, 47 N.E. 294, 295 (N.Y.
1897) (expressing a similar sentiment in dictum).
172 See Charles E. Clark, Trial of Actions Under the Code, 11 CORNELL L.Q.
482, 492-93 (1926).
173 Judge Clark later said of hypotheticals such as the one given in the text-
when a plaintiff sues for services under a written contract and defendant alleges
there is a mistake and seeks reformation, that "[h]istorically, therefore, it would
seem to be a counterclaim; analytically it would seem to be a defense. It has proved
impossible to compel a view that either one or the other must necessarily be the
only correct view." CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING
640-41 (2d ed. 1947).
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further affirmative relief against the plaintiff. It should be
simply regarded as a defense, and if equitable in historical
origin, an equitable defense under the merged system. The
contrary view would emphasize the historical development of the
law. Prior to the merger, the defendant was driven to the
necessity of bringing a bill in equity to fight the legal action.
Under the merged system, the defendant could obtain relief in
the same action. In order to be consistent with past practice,
however, the historical school would require the defendant to
bring a cross-bill in the form of a counterclaim for equitable
relief against the plaintiffs action. 7 4
If the "historical" view had been accepted, there would have
been no equitable defense eo nomine. All equitable defensive
matter would have been in the form of a counterclaim. 175 This
would have certainly solved the jury trial problem in New York.
As equitable counterclaims, their mode of trial would have been
independent of the main action, and thus without a jury. If this
interpretation had been given to the Field Code, then no
constitutional question could have arisen because there was no
antecedent practice of using juries for equitable counterclaims to
legal actions. Indeed, prior to the Field Code, there was no such
thing as an equitable counterclaim to legal actions. 176 As Judge
Cardozo wrote many years later, "a different construction might
have been given to the statute in its beginnings. The question
was one not of constitutional privilege, but of the meaning of
legislation."177
The reader who recalls the unease with which some judges
in the earliest cases under the Field Code contemplated the use
174 See Hinton, supra note 99, at 732-34; James A. Pike & Henry G. Fischer,
Pleadings and Jury Rights in the New Federal Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 645,
659-60 (1940); see also Ward v. Union Trust Co., 152 N.Y.S. 237, 239 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1915) (distinguishing Bennett v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 58 N.E. 7
(N.Y. 1900), as limited to fraud and holding that mistake must be pleaded as a
counterclaim for reformation); Dewey v. Hoag, 15 Barb. 365, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1853) (stating that "where a recovery is attempted to be resisted by interposing an
equitable counter claim in the nature of a cross-bill, the ordinary mode of stating
the agreement in a bill of complaint in chancery, is sufficient").
175 This appears to have been the position taken in Dewey, 15 Barb. at 368. An
early criticism of this view is found in JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES:
REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL ACTION § 29, at 48-49 (5th ed.
1929), which was first published in 1875.
176 See MacKellar v. Rogers, 17 N.E. 350 (N.Y. 1888).
177 Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 146 N.E. 381, 385 (N.Y.
1925).
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of juries to try equitable issues, 178 may wonder why the New
York courts did not grasp this opportunity to allow resolution of
the entire dispute in one proceeding, while keeping the equitable
issues away from the jury. It is submitted that the reason why
this did not happen lies in the chronology of statutory and
judicial developments following the enactment of the Field Code
in 1848. As originally enacted, the Code made no provision for
counterclaims, and no such procedure existed at common law.179
Therefore, when the issue of allowing equitable defenses in legal
actions first came before the Court of Appeals in Haire,180 it was
in the form of a stark choice. Either admit the equitable issue
as a defense, with a jury trial, or refuse to allow such a defense
to be set up in a legal action, and remit the defendant to a
plenary action. Without the mechanism of a counterclaim, the
Code afforded no middle ground by which the equitable matter
could come into the case without the jury's participation. Given
that one of the primary objects of merging law and equity was to
abolish the cumbersome practice of two separate lawsuits to
settle one controversy, it would have been unthinkable for the
court to have chosen the second alternative. True, the
legislature acted swiftly to remedy the defect in the Code and
provided for counterclaims by an amendment added in 1852, but
by then the die had already been cast in favor of allowing the
equitable defense. The only remaining problem in the Code was
to draw some line distinguishing equitable defenses from
counterclaims.
It is easy enough to follow the lead of Haire and say that a
defense is solely negative in effect, while a counterclaim serves
to afford affirmative relief against the plaintiff. While one is
triable according to the main action, the other draws its own
mode of trial. The rub lies in deciding whether affirmative relief
is needed or whether a simple defense is sufficient. A court
committed to the analytical view of equitable defenses by Haire
and Crary'81 was bound to police attempts by defendants to force
defensive equities into the mold of affirmative relief. In 1873, a
leading practice manual noted that the Code did not authorize
178 See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
17) See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 9.9 (3d ed. 1985).
18D See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 67, 98 and accompanying text.
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every defense to be pleaded as a counterclaim and summarized:
"The subject of a counter-claim must be a demand in favor of the
defendant that could be made the foundation of an independent
action against the plaintiff."182 It is necessary to add the
qualification that the affirmative action referred to did not
include the pseudo-affirmative relief formerly available from the
pre-merger chancellor to enjoin some action at law. The
evolution of the equitable defense had supplanted this form of
relief, which had always been defensive in substance.
This appears most forcibly in Walker v. American Central
Insurance Co.,183 in which an insured plaintiff sought to recover
up to the full value of the insurance policy for a fire that had
totally destroyed his stock of merchandise. 84 The policy stated
that it was to take effect on February 1st, and the fire occurred
on February 6th.185 The insurer's answer set up a counterclaim
seeking reformation of the policy 186 on the ground that it was
intended as a renewal of an old policy and not as additional
insurance.87 The answer alleged that it was intended to take
effect only at the expiration of the old policy on February 17, and
that the effective date written in the policy was a mistake.' 8 No
reply was served and the trial court ruled that the purported
counterclaim was in reality a defense, which required no
reply 8 9 The whole case was submitted to the jury, which
returned a verdict in plaintiffs favor. 90
On appeal, the defendant argued that the allegations of the
counterclaim became conclusive because the plaintiff had failed
182 2 WILLIAM WAIT, THE PRACTICE AT LAW, IN EQUITY, AND IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS, IN ALL THE COURTS OF RECORD IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 428
(1873).
183 38 N.E. 106 (N.Y. 1894).
18 See Walker v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 21 N.Y.S. 751 (Sup. Ct. 1893), affd,
38 N.E. 106 (N.Y. 1894).
185 See id.
186 See id. at 751-52. The defendant's pleading strategy was a characteristic
attempt by an insurance company to escape the clutches of a jury, but may also
have been encouraged by unfortunate dictum in Born v. Schrenkeisen, 17 N.E. 339
(N.Y. 1888). Counsel for the insurer cited this case in his brief in Walker but
without dissent, the court ignored it. See Walker v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 143
N.Y. 167, 169 (1894).
187 See Walker, 21 N.Y.S. at 751-52.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See id. at 752.
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to reply.191 The Court of Appeals emphatically rejected this
argument, holding that the facts alleged in the answer
amounted to a defense, not a counterclaim, and that no reply
was necessary.192 The court stated a two-part test for reducing
something pleaded as a counterclaim to a defense. First, when
the facts pleaded are proved, "their inevitable first effect would
be to disprove and defeat the plaintiffs claim."193 Second, "that
[the] result would furnish a remedy complete and perfect, and
leave the defendant in a position of entire safety," and not in
need of any more relief.94
In applying this test, the court reaffirmed its commitment to
what Judge Clark later called the analytical view of how
defensive equities function in modern practice.195 In Walker, the
court held that the pre-merger practice of obtaining a decree of
reformation was now self-executing under the merged system of
practice. 196 The court noted that the pleaded facts had the effect
of rebutting the plaintiffs claim by operation of law and that an
actual decree of reformation would be superfluous. 197 It also
found that the second part of the quoted test was satisfied,
stating that "[the defense at law was perfect and fully
adequate." and that by the time the fire occurred "[the policy]
had matured, and ceased to be a continuing liability under
which new rights could accrue." 198 Referring to the statutory
requirement that a counterclaim must be an independent cause
of action, the court applied that criterion to the facts of the case
and concluded that an attempt by the insurer to sue for
reformation after the fire loss would have been dismissed on the
ground that its "remedy at law would be adequate, and no
necessity or ground for equitable interference would be
191 See Walker, 38 N.E. at 107.
192 See id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
196 See Walker, 38 N.E. 107-08.
1907 See id. While not citing the Walker case, the court's streamlined view of
equitable defenses is approved in Walter Wheeler Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32
YALE L.J. 645, 653-54 (1923). Cook did not approve of trying equitable defenses by
jury. See id. at 651-52. Rather, he discussed the subject at large, without reference
to the development of New York law. See id.
193 Walker, 38 N.E. at 108. But see National Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 81 N.E.
562, 563 (N.Y. 1907) (discussing the second part of the "Walker" test, although not
specifically mentioning Walker).
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disclosed."199 The remedy at law was the insurer's ability to
plead and prove its equitable defense when sued by the insured.
The court concluded that the case was properly sent to the jury
for decision.200 It is surely significant that in 1894, the court
included the equitable defense within the "remedy at law," the
availability of which precluded an independent action in equity
for reformation and, consequently, an attempt to state a
counterclaim for reformation.
Although some confusion had been sown by dictum in the
1888 case of Born v. Schrenkeisen,201 the main battle over
whether the courts would continue to protect jury trial of
equitable defenses against attempts by defendants to plead
them as non-jury counterclaims was fought in 1900, eight years
after the Southard and Kirchner cases, discussed above.202 Chief
Judge Parker, who had written the opinion in Southard,
apparently had second thoughts about allowing juries to decide
equitable issues such as reformation-but he protested in
dissent.
In Bennett v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 20 3 the
plaintiff contracted to build two wells for the defendant at a
price stated in the contract as $10.00 per one-thousand gallons
of water produced per day.20 4 The wells produced 1,150,000
gallons per day and plaintiff demanded $11,520.00.205 The
defendant's answer pleaded a counterclaim alleging that the
true agreement was for $1.00 per one-thousand gallons, and that
the price stated in the written contract was a mistake. 206 The
199 Walker, 38 N.E. at 108.
200 See id.
201 17 N.E. 339 (N.Y. 1888). In Born, the action was for one year's guaranteed
minimum royalty owed by the assignees of a patent. See id. at 340. The defense was
a mistake in the written contract which should have contained a condition, not a
covenant. See id. at 340-41. Given the lengthy term of the contract, the defendants
probably could have pleaded a genuine counterclaim. The court clearly erred in
suggesting that they were required to do so. See id. at 341. A defendant, may opt to
simply establish a defense and withhold a counterclaim for later. See, e.g., Brown v.
Gallaudet, 80 N.Y. 413 (1880).
202 See supra notes 113, 122 and accompanying text.
203 58 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 1900). This case was decided sufficiently close to the
ratification of the 1894 constitution to be relevant in establishing how equitable
defenses were tried at that time.
204 See Bennett v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 49 N.Y.S. 833, 833 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1898), affd, 58 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 1900).
205 See id. at 833-34.
206 See id. at 834.
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defendant asked that the contract be reformed.2 7 The issue of
jury trial was squarely presented by the defendant's motion to
have the reformation counterclaim tried first at special term,
where the court would decide it without a jury.208 This motion
was denied and the trial before a jury resulted in a verdict for
the plaintiff.20 9  On appeal, the defendant relied on the
counterclaim statute, section 974 of the Throop Code, in urging
that the trial court erred in denying its motion and submitting
the issue to the jury.210 The court affirmed the jury verdict,
holding that a so-called counterclaim, that was also a complete
defense, was not covered by section 974.211 The court said the
section did not apply when "the matter alleged also constitutes a
defense, and relieves the defendant as fully as the allowance of
the counterclaim."212 The court reasoned that the jury, whose
verdict was conclusive, properly tried the case, because the
defendant alleged a simple equitable defense.
In Bennett, Chief Judge Parker wrote a dissent in which
another judge joined.213 His principal concern was voiced in his
opening sentence: "In the view of our jurisprudence, a court
cannot, as well and as safely as a jury, decide common-law
issues, while, on the other hand, a jury cannot as well and as
safely as a court, try equitable issues."214 The Chief Judge found
statutory sanction for his policy position in the counterclaim
statute.215  He rejected the majority's distinction between
different kinds of counterclaims and its corollary that new
matter even though pleaded as a counterclaim, did not attract a
separate mode of trial if it also amounted to a defense to the
action.216
The Chief Judge's strongest point was his policy view that
lay juries were not well suited to try equitable issues that often
required sophisticated legal judgment. He may well have had in
207 See id.
203 See id.
209 See id.
210 See Bennett, 58 N.E. at 7.
211 See id.
212 See id. The defense had pleaded its new matter "for a defense and by way of
counterclaim." Id.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 7-8 (Parker, J., dissenting).
215 See id. at 8.
216 See id. at 8-9.
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mind the Southard case,217 in which his own elaborate
description of the appropriate language with which to explain
the burden of proof required for contract reformation to a jury
had a labored air of unreality and futility. In Bennett, Chief
Judge Parker also made a trenchant point when he argued that
had the defendant taken the initiative as a plaintiff and
commenced an action to reform the written contract, it clearly
would have been triable without a jury.218 What rational
purpose is served by insisting on a jury trial when, fortuitously,
the procedural posture of the case is reversed and the
reformation claim is raised defensively? No one has ever made a
convincing case that a jury trial is the best way to balance and
decide fact-oriented and multifaceted, often discretionary,
equitable issues. The Code Commissioners and the early cases
may have viewed the rule allowing juries to try equitable
defenses as the lesser of two evils, where the other option was to
exclude equitable defenses altogether. They also appeared to
have blithely accepted, as an article of faith, that equitable
issues were as easily tried "in the one court as the other."219
The Chief Judge faltered badly, however, when he
attempted to locate his policy position in the statutory structure
of the Throop Code.220 There were many cases on the books
recognizing equitable defenses and the use of juries in trying
them. Unless all of those cases were meaningless, some
objective test must exist for distinguishing defenses from
counterclaims. It could not have been the intent of the
legislature simply to turn the mode of trial over to the drafters
of defensive pleadings. Yet Chief Judge Parker's opinion
appears to have been willing to allow any defense to be framed
as a counterclaim whenever a defendant chose that form of
pleading.
The Chief Judge also failed to consider the implications of
his position with respect to the established rule in New York
that counterclaims are not compulsory. A defendant may
withhold a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction as
the one alleged in the complaint against him and assert it in a
217 See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text for discussion of Chief
Judge Parker's opinion.
218 See Bennett, 58 N.E. at 8 (Parker, J., dissenting).
219 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
220 See Bennett, 58 N.E. at 8 (Parker, J., dissenting).
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subsequent action22 1 -subject to principles of collateral estoppel
affecting common issues necessarily decided in the first
action.222 A simple defense, on the other hand, must of course be
raised in the first action or else the resulting judgment becomes
res judicata.22 Therefore, if the Chief Judge was correct in
characterizing the new matter pleaded by defendant as a
counterclaim, the inference is that the defendant could have
withheld it for subsequent litigation. But does that inference
withstand scrutiny when tested against the facts of the case? If
the defendant had not raised the issue of mistake, the plaintiff
presumably would have recovered judgment based on the
written price of $10.00 per one thousand gallons. Would Chief
Judge Parker have allowed the owner thereafter to sue the well
company for reformation of the contract and restitution of the
difference between $10.00 and $1.00 per one thousand gallons?
One presumes not.224 It would seem that the preclusive effect of
failing to raise the mistake issue in the first action is more
consistent with regarding it as a defense than as a counterclaim.
It is unnecessary to say that new matter of an equitable
character raised in an answer must be either a defense or a
counterclaim. The same facts may support both a defense and a
counterclaim. As stated by Pomeroy:
The facts from which the defensive right arises, may perhaps,
in a proper occasion and when employed for that purpose, be
made the basis of affirmative relief; but, when so employed,
221 See, e.g., National Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 81 N.E. 562 (N.Y. 1907); Brown
v. Gallaudet, 80 N.Y. 413 (1880); Tyler v. Standard Wine Co., 102 N.Y.S. 65 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1907), affd, 106 N.Y.S. 1148 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1907).
222 See Batavia Kill Watershed Dist. v. Charles 0. Desch, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1115
(N.Y. 1982); Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 115 N.E. 993 (N.Y. 1917); see also
FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.9 (2d ed.
1977) (discussing a civil action where the complaint presents equitable issues and
the counterclaim presents legal issues).
223 See Savage v. Allen, 54 N.Y. 458 (1873); Aubern City Bank v. Leonard, 20
How. Pr. 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1860); Hinman v. Judson, 13 Barb. 629
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1852); Fay v. Hill, 249 F. 415 (8th Cir. 1918); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18(2), cmt. c, illus. 4 (1982). Cf. Colson v.
Pelgram, 182 N.E. 19 (N.Y. 1932).
224 See Massari v. Einsiedler, 78 A.2d 572, 577 (N.J. 1951) (holding that the
disposition of the former proceedings is res judicata on the defendant's right to seek
reformation of the contract and enforce the reformed version); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2)(b) cmt. f, illus. 9-10 (1982). Cf Bernard E. Gegan,
Claim Preclusion and Reformation of Contracts: New York CPLR 3002(d), 70 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 539, 560 n.92 (1996) (discussing the concepts of issue and claim
preclusion in the context of the contract type case).
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they would not be a defence.... If to this negative effect [the
defense] is added the privilege of obtaining an affirmative
judgment against the plaintiff, based upon the same equitable
right, the latter so far ceases to be a "defence," and becomes in
turn a cause of action.225
Therefore, in a case where the defendant alleges new matter
of an equitable character, even if labeled a counterclaim, in so
far as it would defeat the relief requested by the plaintiff, it is
also a defense to which the rule of claim preclusion applies. To
the extent it might be raised against a different cause of action
by the plaintiff, or constitute the basis of an affirmative claim by
the defendant for relief against the plaintiff, it is a counterclaim.
In this aspect, claim preclusion does not apply, and issue
preclusion would be applicable, but only as to those issues
actually presented and decided.
This view of claim preclusion as applied to a cross or
overlapping defense/counterclaim is supported by Judge
Cardozo's notable opinion in Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C.
Nieberg Realty Corp.226 In Schuylkill, a seller of coal sued five
defendants for the price of coal delivered under a written
contract.227 At issue was whether each defendant was liable for
coal delivered to the others, i.e., whether the contract called for
joint and several liability.22 An earlier court decision
interpreted the contract as creating joint liability and gave
judgment against all of the defendants. 229 Later, the seller sued
the same defendants for the price of subsequent deliveries of
coal. 23 0  In this action, the defendants counterclaimed for
reformation, alleging that by mistake the contract failed to
express the intent of the parties that only those who received
coal should be required to pay for it.231 The Court of Appeals
reversed a summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the
former judgment did not preclude the defendants from litigating
the merits of the counterclaim for reformation. 23
225 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES: REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL
RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL ACTION § 27, at 47 (5th ed. 1929).
226 165 N.E. 456 (N.Y. 1929).
227 See id. at 457.
228 See id.
229 See id.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See id. at 458.
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Obviously, the rule by which a claim is merged in the
resulting judgment would not bar the seller from suing for
subsequent deliveries of coal. They presented a different claim
for different sums of money. The same freedom from claim
preclusion applies to the defendants; the former judgment did
not act as a bar to litigating the subsequent deliveries. The
court recognized what we now call collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion-any issue actually litigated and decided is final.
That meant that the defendants could not relitigate the meaning
and effect of the written contract; on that issue they had their
day in court. Presumably, however, the equitable issue of
mistake in drafting the contract had not been raised in the first
case, so that issue was open and litigable in the second case.
In sum, as to subsequent deliveries of coal, the equitable
issue in the first case was a counterclaim, which the defendants
were privileged to withhold and save for later.2 3 As to the price
owed for the delivery sued on in the first case, the equitable
issue was a defense and not open to relitigation. This follows
from Judge Cardozo's definition of the scope of claim preclusion
as applicable to any relitigation that "would destroy or impair
rights or interests established by the first [judgment]." 2-3 As
applied to the facts of the second case, whether or not the buyers
were liable for the price of subsequent deliveries of coal would
have no effect on the seller's right to keep the money recovered
in the first case. If that money had been at stake in the second
action, Judge Cardozo cautioned that "[a] different question
would have been presented."235
Schuylkill Fuel illustrates that where a contract calls for a
number of performances over a period of time, the existence of
some equitable ground for the buyer to resist a claim for
payment may present simultaneously a genuine equitable
defense and a genuine equitable counterclaim. When this is the
233 The legitimacy of the defendant pleading a counterclaim is consistent with
Walker v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 38 N.E. 106 (N.Y. 1894). See supra text
accompanying notes 183-200. The insurance loss in Walker was a single event,
which when litigated in the form of an equitable defense, would end the
controversy. In Schuylkill Fuel, the contract called for a series of performances,
each one of which could give rise to new issues.
234 Schuylkill Fuel, 165 N.E. at 457.
25 Id. at 458; accord Henry Modell & Co. v. Minister, Elders and Deacons of
the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, 502 N.E.2d 978, 979 (N.Y. 1986) (litigating
the right to the possession of the same property that was involved in successive
actions on different theories).
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case, there is authority for allowing the defendant to commence
a separate action for equitable relief,236 and presumably in the
alternative, to plead a counterclaim and invoke the counterclaim
statute's provision for a separate mode of trial.237 On the other
hand, the reasoning of Bennett238 might permit the mode of
trying the defense to trump the mode of trying the counterclaim
where the same equitable issue is dispositive of both.239 In such
a case, it would seem that the legal remedy, for the issues
triable by jury as of right in the main action, are adequate to
protect the defendant's rights; and this is the basic test laid
down in Walker v. American Central Insurance Co. 240 There is
no denying that if CPLR 4101 is held unconstitutional insofar as
it denies jury trial of equitable defenses to legal actions, the
elusive dividing line and overlap between defenses and
counterclaims will once again move to center stage.
B. Defenses, Counterclaims, and Jury Trial Under the Civil
Practice Act: The Susquehanna Steamship Case
Even though the manner of trying equitable defenses had
been settled for many years, the debate broke out one last time
in Susquehanna Steamship Co. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co. 241 This
case was decided under the Civil Practice Act, which replaced
the Throop Code in 1921.242 Up until 1963, when the CPLR
abolished the distinction between equitable defenses and
counterclaims as far as jury trial is concerned, this case came to
236 See National Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 81 N.E. 562, 563-65 (N.Y. 1907)
(holding that a defense in a pending action did not bar the defendant from seeking
reformation of a fire insurance policy for mutual mistake in a separate action);
Burke v. Betts, 214 N.Y.S. 208, 210 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1926) (stating that "a
judgment for the defendant in the equity action would not bar such defendant's
action on [a promissory note], since no counterclaim has been set up in that
litigation").
237 See Samuel Strauss & Co. v. American Credit Indem. Co., 196 N.Y.S. 708,
710 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1922) (holding that the defendant was entitled to have his
counterclaim tried at special term because it was a case in equity).
m33 See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text (providing an example of a
case in which the jury was presented with the equitable issue of contract
formation).
239 See Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 115 N.E. 993, 993 (N.Y. 1917), which
provides an analogy for this suggestion.
240 See supra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.
241 146 N.E. 381 (N.Y. 1925).
242 See Act of May 21, 1920, ch. 925, § 1540, 1920 N.Y. Laws 19, 521, amended
by Act of Apr. 14, 1921, ch. 199, § 26, 1921 N.Y. Laws 794, 823.
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be regarded as the definitive statement of the old rule. In fact,
the Advisory Commission that recommended the change
incorporated in CPLR 4101 apparently regarded the case as the
fons et origio of the rule-the nineteenth century antecedents
were conveniently forgotten.24
In Susquehanna Steamship, a party who had chartered a
ship assigned its right to a sub-charterer. 2 " The sub-charterer
entered into a written contract with the owner in which it
promised to make advances on the prime charter hire directly to
the owner, subject to refund if there was an excess of what was
actually owed by the prime charterer.245 When sued by the
owner's assignee for the balance, the defendant argued that the
contract was, in effect, only a guarantee of collection.246 On the
issue of contract interpretation, Judge Cardozo's opinion
contrasted the language of the contract with the interpretation
suggested by the defendant:
The owner's promise is to refund if the advances are in excess of
what the charterer shall owe. The defendant would have us
transform this into a promise to refund if the advances are in
excess of what the charterer can pay. That would be to remake
243 See supra notes 7, 8. Although neither the Advisory Commission nor the
leading text cite any authority for this extraordinary notion, the principal source is
probably CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 105 (2d
ed. 1947), which in turn relies on the author's own critique of the Susquehanna case
published one year after that decision in Charles E. Clark, Trial of Actions Under
the Code, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 482, 495 n.56 (1926). Judge Clark does not indicate any
awareness of the issue raised by the 1894 constitution, and as a matter of statutory
interpretation, he ignores many of the early cases reviewed in this article and
attempts to downplay the significance of others. For example, he remarks that
Bennett v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 58 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 1900), was the product of
a divided court and only cited one unimportant case in support of its conclusion (the
Appellate Division's opinion in Bennett supplied relevant authorities). Of course,
the learned author is entitled to make these observations for what they are worth,
but they do not go to the heart of the matter. Cases cited by Judge Clark in favor of
non-jury trial of equitable defenses are all cases in which the courts essentially
conceded the point, by forcing the issue into the mold of an equitable counterclaim.
One court recognized an equitable defense for what it was, but, contrary to Judge
Clark's citation, held it triable by jury. See Sturm v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 38
N.Y.C. Super. 281 (Super. Ct. N.Y. County 1874), affd, 63 N.Y. 77 (1875). The court
stated that "fallthough to a purely legal claim an equitable defense may be
interposed, yet there is no reason why the matters out of which such equitable
defense arises may not be tried by a jury."Id. at 298.
2 See Susquehanna Steamship, 146 N.E. at 382.
245 See id.
246 See id.
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the contract rather than construe it. 2 4 7
During the jury trial, the trial judge excluded evidence of
conversations leading up to the contract.248 He ruled them
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, a ruling the court
did not criticize.249 The defendant's answer, however, had
pleaded as an affirmative defense that the written contract
mistakenly failed to express the true intentions of the parties.250
The trial judge's refusal to admit the evidence was apparently
based on the fact that the pleadings disclosed no counterclaim in
equity. The Appellate Division affirmed a money judgment for
the plaintiff.2 51  It held that the parol evidence was not
admissible before the jury under the equitable defense. 2
Furthermore, a counterclaim for reformation was required to
raise the issue and render the evidence admissible-before the
court, not the jury.Y3
In some earlier cases canvassed in this article, hard
questions were raised by defendants who insisted on framing
their equitable issue as a counterclaim, necessitating an inquiry
into whether the counterclaim was genuine, i.e., whether it
secured some advantage or protection not afforded by a defense.
No such difficulty, however, was present in the Susquehanna
Steamship case. The question was whether a defendant, who
was content to rely on a simple equitable defense, ought to be
required to plead a counterclaim and forego his right to jury
trial.
The Court of Appeals reversed and granted a new trial in an
elaborate opinion by Judge Cardozo containing two parts.254
First, he reaffirmed a series of cases holding that a defense, not
a counterclaim, was the appropriate pleading by which to raise
new matter, legal or equitable, that had the effect of defeating
the claim sued upon, without obtaining affirmative relief against
the plaintiff2-5 -only the latter being the proper office of a
247 Id.
248 See id. at 383.
29 See id.
250 See id.
2' See Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 203 N.Y.S. 568, 579
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1924), reuld, 146 N.E. 381 (N.Y. 1925).
252 See id. at 578.
2 5 See id.
254 See Susquehanna Steamship, 146 N.E. at 385.
25 See id. at 383-84.
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counterclaim.256 Implicit in this holding was the proposition
that reformation may be a self-executing defense, and that an
actual decree was not to be regarded as "affirmative relief when
its only function was to defeat the plaintiffs claim.2 7 Indeed,
the court noted an earlier case that held an actual decree
unnecessary.258
In the second part of his opinion Judge Cardozo discussed
jury trial of equitable defenses in greater detail than had any
previous case.2 9 He quoted statutory language from the Civil
Practice Act and the Throop Code mandating that in an action
for money only, a jury trial was required for "an issue of fact."260
He further noted that "lain issue of fact arises upon a denial in
the answer, or upon 'a material allegation of new matter'
constituting a defense."261 For this rule, Cardozo cited the
relevant sections of the Civil Practice Act, the Throop Code and
the Field Code.262 Finally, he observed that:
There is no distinction in this respect between kinds of
defenses, dependent upon their origin in equity or at law. The
distinction is between all defenses on the one side and
counterclaims on the other. Civ. Prac. Act § 424; Code Civ. Pro.
§ 974. The rule is settled under these provisions that equitable
defenses are triable in the same way as defenses that are
legal.263
Judge Cardozo's opinion is remarkable for the candor with
which he faced up to the defects of the rule he enforced. Echoing
the concerns of several judges in the past, he acknowledged the
difficulty of applying the rule in practice, because, "[v]ery likely
256 See id.
2 See id. at 384.
2= See id. (citing Hoppough v. Struble, 60 N.Y. 430, 434 (1875) (noting that a
reformation of the deed was not necessary for the defense of the action)); accord
Walker v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 38 N.E. 106, 108 (N.Y. 1894) (stating that the
equitable remedy of a reformation would be superfluous because it was not needed
as "the contract as reformed had already been finally executed").
29 See Susquehanna Steamship, 146 N.E. at 384-85.
2Go Id. at 384 (quoting N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 425 (1921); N.Y. CODE Civ. PROC.
§ 968 (1876)). The quoted language goes back to § 253 of the Field Code. See N.Y.
CODE PROC. § 253 (1849).
261 See Susquehanna Steamship, 146 N.E. at 384 (quoting N.Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT
§ 422 (1921); N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 964 (1876); N.Y. CODE PROC. §§ 253, 250
(1849)).
2G2 See Susquehanna Steamship, 146 N.E. at 384.
263 See id. (citing the counterclaim statutes of N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 424 (1921)
and N.Y. CODE CIV PROC. § 974 (1876)).
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there is danger of confusion and injustice at times in this
blending of the issue."264 Judge Cardozo further noted that
"[j]uries may find it difficult to apply the presumption that
preliminary treaties are merged in the written contract if they
are permitted to consider such treaties as evidence of
mistake."265 The only compensating factors that Judge Cardozo
could identify were the high burden of proof in reformation
cases, the power to bifurcate trials, and the power of appellate
courts to police jury verdicts.266
Judge Cardozo clearly had some reservations about the
wisdom of the New York rule requiring a jury trial of equitable
defenses when interposed in cases in which jury trial was a
matter of right. Even during his lifetime, Cardozo was
renowned as a progressive, even liberal, judge. Less widely
appreciated is a point made by his recent biographer, Professor
Kaufman,267 that he had a great respect for and deference to the
co-ordinate branches of government. If Cardozo were convinced
that the legislature had decreed a clear rule, he would be the
last person to deviate from that command.268 In Susquehanna
Steamship, Cardozo acknowledged that other states and the
federal courts had construed their rules of practice to allow for
non-jury trial of equitable defenses, 269 but concluded that "[wie
are committed to another holding, not only by the reported
precedents, but by the consistent practice of trial judges
extending over many years."270
264 Id. at 385.
265 Id.
26 See id.
267 Professor Andrew L. Kaufman is the Charles Stebbins Fairchild Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School.
268 See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 5,497,569-77 (1998).
269 See, e.g., Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922); Breitung
v. Packard, 260 F. 895 (D. Mass. 1919). The issue is now governed by FED. R. CIV.
P. 38(a). See Granite State Ins. Co. v. Smart Modular Tech., Inc., 76 F.3d 1023 (9th
Cir. 1996). When Cardozo sat on the United States Supreme Court, he had occasion
to discuss how equitable replications to legal affirmative defenses, e.g., releases of
tort liability, were triable by the court under federal law. See Radio Corp. of
America v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 459, 463 (1935) (dictum).
270 Susquehanna Steamship, 146 N.E. at 385. Cardozo's familiarity with code
practice was of long standing. His biographer tells us that when he commenced
practice in 1891:
[olne of [his] first assignments as a fledgling lawyer was to make a study,
for his firm's use, of a recent multivolume annotated version of the Field
Code of Civil Procedure, which regulated the course of litigation in New
York courts. Although he had not been asked to learn the statute section
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Jury trial in civil cases is not universally admired.271 It is
no accident that the federal guarantee contained in the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution has never been
deemed essential to the concept of ordered liberty nor made
binding on the states through incorporation by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although sympathetic to the civil jury in general,
this author has no hesitation in saying that the nature of most
equitable defenses is that they are far better suited to
determination by a trained jurist than by a lay jury.
Nevertheless, the Constitution must be obeyed, and the specific
question presented leaves little or no room for judicial activism
based on policy preferences. As the Supreme Court of California
observed with respect to the jury trial guarantee contained in its
constitution: "what that right is, is a purely historical question,
a fact which is to be ascertained like any other social, political or
legal fact. The right is the historical right enjoyed at the time it
was guaranteed by the Constitution."272
In providing for non-jury trial of equitable defenses, CPLR
4101 sets forth a better rule than the one it replaced. When the
cases are dispassionately viewed as historical facts, however, it
is submitted that they show that juries were used to try
equitable defenses from the earliest days of the Field Code.
That being so, the practice was raised to constitutionally
guaranteed status if, as has been assumed, the "heretofore used"
provision of the 1894 constitution constitutionalized the
statutory rights created by the Field Code in 1848 and continued
by the Throop Code in 1876.
IV. THE 1894 CONSTITUTION REVISITED
In his Susquehanna Steamship opinion,273 Judge Cardozo
refrained from relying on a point that would have clinched his
argument for jury trial of equitable defenses. He did not say
by section, he did just that. He had a retentive memory, and his newly
acquired encyclopedic knowledge of New York procedure earned him a
reputation as a master of that subject quite early in his career.
KAUFMAN, supra note 268, at 55. In 1891, Cardozo's assignment would have been to
study the Throop Code of Civil Procedure, a prolix work containing over 3,400
sections.
271 See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, 4101.09, at 41-27 to 41-31 (providing
a useful collection of sources).
272 People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 231 P.2d 832, 835 (Cal. 1951).
273 146 N.E. 381 (N.Y. 1925).
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that the wisdom of the past practice of using juries had been
placed beyond debate by the New York Constitution of 1894. He
did observe that the Field Code might have been interpreted
differently in the beginning. "The question," he said, "was one
not of constitutional privilege, but of the meaning of
legislation."274 Is there any significance in Cardozo's use of the
past tense "was," in referring to the court's and the legislature's
freedom of action in dealing with jury trial of equitable defenses
when the Field Code was adopted in 1848? On the one hand, it
may have been a straightforward use of the past tense in
making an historical statement. On the other hand, however, a
jurist sensitive to the nuances of language may have implied a
contrast between the courts' freedom in 1848 and the constraint
imposed by the constitution at the time he wrote that particular
word in 1925.
The constitutional question was a delicate one at that time.
As previously stated, it is presently the accepted view that the
1894 constitution upgraded all existing statutory jury trial
rights to constitutionally guaranteed ones.275 No one in recent
years has suggested otherwise. When Susquehanna Steamship
was decided, however, the situation was quite different. At that
time, few voices had ever so much as hinted that the period
referred to by the "heretofore used" guarantee had been moved
up to 1894.276 Actually, there were post-1894 cases on the books
that expressly said that the period referred to by the guarantee
stopped with the constitution of 1846. In 1915, in Moot v.
Moot,277 the court held that a constitutional right of jury trial on
the issue of adultery in a divorce action could only be waived as
"prescribed by law," and that a rule of court was not the
equivalent of a statutory law.278 The court said that "[tihe
measure of the right of trial by jury preserved by the state
Constitution (article I, § 2) in actions for divorce is the right to a
jury trial in such cases as it existed at the time of the adoption
274 Id. at 385.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
276 The possibility was suggested by Judge Willard Bartlett's concurring
opinion in Sporza v. German Sa. Bank, 84 N.E. 406, 411 (N.Y. 1908) (reviewing
relevant text of all New York constitutions) and In re Brenner, 71 N.Y.S. 44, 50
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1901), affd., 74 N.Y.S. 1121 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1901).
277 108 N.E. 424 (N.Y. 1915). This holding had been anticipated in Conderman
v. Conderman, 44 Hun. 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 5th Dep't 1887).
278 Moot, 108 N.E. at 426.
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of the Constitution of 1846."279
It is therefore understandable that, even if he had a position
on the effect of the 1894 constitution,280 Judge Cardozo
circumvented a constitutional holding and simply reaffirmed
prior interpretations of "the meaning of legislation."
The statement in Moot was not necessary to the decision
insofar as it excluded the period between 1846 and 1894 from
the coverage of the guarantee. If the right to a jury trial of
adultery in divorce cases antedated the 1846 constitution, it also
necessarily antedated the 1894 constitution. The result,
therefore, is the same under either view. Subsequent cases,
involving jury trial of counterclaims, however, transformed the
dictum into holdings.
Legal counterclaims in equity actions were unknown to the
dual court system prior to the merger in 1846. As a result, the
case of MacKellar v. Rogers,281 concluded that a jury trial was
not constitutionally guaranteed by the constitution of 1846, but
only by the counterclaim statute-section 974 of the Throop
Code. The MacKelar case by itself does not say anything about
the effect of the 1894 constitution because the case was decided
six years before that constitution was adopted. Several cases
decided after 1894, however, required the courts to decide
whether the right to jury trial of legal counterclaims remained
merely statutory under section 974 of the Throop Code,28 2 or
whether it had acquired constitutional protection under the
1894 constitution. A definitive decision on the status of the
right was required as a result of the holding of Moot, stating
that a constitutional jury trial right could only be waived as
"prescribed by law" and that a court rule was not the equivalent
of a provision of law.
In Manhattan Life Insurance Co. v. Hammerstein Opera
Co.,283 a defendant in an equity action for mortgage foreclosure
279 Id. at 425; accord Cohen v. Cohen, 145 N.Y.S. 652 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1914).
28D Although Judge Cardozo was on the Court of Appeals when Moot was
decided, he did not participate in the decision, and cannot be counted among the
judges who presumably approved the dictum that the "heretofore used" period
ended in 1846.
281 17 N.E. 350 (N.Y. 1888).
= N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 974 (1882). Section 974 became law when the
Throop Code was first adopted in 1876. See supra note 157.
28 171 N.Y.S. 678 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1918); accord Maag v. Maag Gear Co.,
184 N.Y.S. 630 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1920); Arnot v. Nevins, 60 N.Y.S. 401 (App. Div.
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counterclaimed for damages. 284 The trial court denied the
defendant's motion for a jury trial on his counterclaim because it
was not made within the time allowed by the rule of court.285
The Appellate Division, acknowledging Moot, affirmed the result
and held that noncompliance with a court rule could not effect a
waiver of a constitutional right to jury trial.286 The court relied
on MacKelar in holding that the right to jury trial of a legal
counterclaim was merely a statutory right and not a
constitutional right.28 7 This holding was followed in several
cases.288  The 1958 Report of the Advisory Committee on
Practice and Procedure did not betray any awareness of a
problem when it simultaneously adopted the inconsistent
positions that the 1894 constitution upgraded all prior statutory
jury rights;289 and that there is no constitutional right to jury
trial of a legal counterclaim.290
An amendment to the Lien Law passed in 1929 provided
further occasion for courts to reaffirm the non-constitutional
status of the right created by the original counterclaim statute,
and its successor, section 424 of the Civil Practice Act. It
provided that in an action to foreclose a lien, "in case a
counterclaim is set forth by any defendant in his answer, such
defendant shall be deemed to have waived a trial by jury of the
issues raised thereby."291  This was in derogation of the
counterclaim statute and would not be valid if the right created
in 1876 became constitutionally vested in 1894. Yet, when the
Lien Law amendment came before the courts, it was held as a
valid modification of a statutory rule.292
1st Dep't 1899). These two cases reached the same conclusion.
284 See Hammerstein, 171 N.Y.S. at 678.
28 See id.
286 See id. at 678-79.
287 See id.
2ai See, e.g., Elmira Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Spring, 38 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1941); In
re Blair, 272 N.Y.S. 864 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1934); Fout v. Wolfe, 245 N.Y.S. 505
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1930); In re Shinder, 182 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1958); In re Doherty, 279 N.Y.S. 401 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1935). See generally
WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, % 4101.34, at 41-65 to 41-68.
289 See N.Y. STATE ADVISORY COMM. ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SECOND
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
Legis. Doc. No. 13, at 564-65 (1958).
290 See id. at 217, 575-76.
291 Act of Apr. 10, 1929, ch. 515, § 3, 1929 N.Y. Laws 1037, 1040-41 (current
version at N.Y. LIEN LAW § 45 (McKinney 1993)).
292 See Klein, Inc. v. New Deal Bldg. Corp., 14 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. Kings
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As recently as 1962, the Court of Appeals unconditionally
invoked the MacKellar holding that a legal counterclaim to an
equitable action was not a constitutionally protected right. In
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Conway,293 a life insurance
company brought an action in equity after the death of the
insured,294 seeking rescission of a decree rescinding the policy
for fraud.295 The beneficiary denied the allegations of the
complaint and counterclaimed for the proceeds. 29 6 The court
ruled that the Appellate Division had discretion to sequence a
non-jury trial of the plaintiffs equity claim first, even though a
decision adverse to the beneficiary would effectively conclude the
case and forestall a jury determination of the beneficiary's legal
claim under the insurance contract.297 Since the beneficiary's
right to a jury trial of its counterclaim was statutory only, the
court held that the Appellate Division's ruling "does not raise
any constitutional issue and we proceed to consider whether
that court abused its discretion."298 The court went on to hold
that the beneficiary's failure to promptly commence a plenary
action at law on the policy, after the company gave notice that it
was rejecting the insurance claim, justified an exercise of
discretion that resulted in denying her a jury trial.299
None of these holdings have been overruled,300 but the tide
County 1939); Fulmer v. Sovocool, 274 N.Y.S.2d 215 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1966);
Birch Bldg. Corp. v. Thorp, 82 N.Y.S.2d 420 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1948). Klein and
similar cases were distinguished in Cowper Co. v. Buffalo Hotel Dev. Venture, 471
N.Y.S.2d 913, 916-17 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1984) (holding that a jury trial is
available when the legal counterclaims were set up in an action where the plaintiff
joined legal claims with an equitable lien foreclosure claim). In Cowper, the
counterclaims raised common issues with the plaintiffs legal claims, and the court
held that the waiver rule of the Lien Law did not apply. See id. at 917.
Interestingly, just like the Committee Report, see supra note 289 and accompanying
text, the court expressly endorsed the popular view of the 1894 constitution, yet
failed to grasp its significance with respect to the Lien Law's derogation from a pre-
1894 statutory right to jury trial of legal counterclaims.
203 183 N.E.2d 754 (N.Y. 1962).
24 See id. at 755.
25 See id.
2= See id.
= See id. at 756 (basing its holding on the fact that the Appellate Division is a
branch of the supreme court and therefore has discretion).
2s Id. at 755.
299 See id. at 756.
300 But see Forrest v. Fuchs, 481 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1984).
This case is rare in that it clearly saw that the necessary effect of the 1894
constitution was to constitutionalize the right to jury trial of legal counterclaims.
See id. at 253-54. This conclusion was unnecessary to the decision because of a
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of opinion on the coverage of the "heretofore used" clause began
to turn with the opinions of Surrogate Delehanty in In re
Leary,301 and Surrogate Sobel in In re Luria.30 2 They observed
that the 1846 constitution had been held to move forward the
timeline for applying the guarantee. 30 3 The 1894 constitution
used exactly the same language; should it not have the same
effect?
Although this view has now become canonical, 30 4 it rests on
nothing more than the assumption that language used in 1894
must have the same "updating" effect as the same language used
in 1846. Moreover, the assumption is a purely retroactive
exercise in logic. There is no evidence that the delegates who
"drafted" the clause in 1894 had any actual intention whatsoever
to update the jury trial guarantee from 1846 to 1894; they
appear to have simply carried forward the provision contained in
the 1846 constitution unchanged. 30 5 Although the current
interpretation of the language of article I, § 2 of the 1894
constitution appears to have the inevitability of a syllogism, it is
finding of waiver. See id. at 254. Cf WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, 4101.34, at
41-65 to 41-68 (seeing the logical implications but not following them). A few pages
further on, the same text repeats the statement that "[tihe right to a jury trial on
equitable defenses is not constitutional, as it was not available prior to 1777 and
was not afforded by statute enacted prior to 1894." Id. 4101.38, at 41 -78.
301 23 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1940), affd sub noam. In re Werner, 24
N.Y.S.2d 1000 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1940), affid, 34 N.E.2d 383 (N.Y. 1941).
302 313 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1970); see also Mayers, supra note
23, at 185. It may be presumed that Mayers' article played a role in persuading the
delegates to the 1938 constitutional convention to change the wording of Art I § 2 to
its present form.
303 See Conderman v. Conderman, 44 Hun. 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 5th Dep't
1887) (holding that the "heretofore used" clause moved the period covered by the
guarantee up to 1846); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); see also Cancemi
v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 135 (1858); United States Trust Co. v. United States Fire
Ins. Co., 18 N.Y. 199, 210-11 (1858) (assuming that the period covered by the
guarantee was pre-1846); but see People v. Cosmos, 98 N.E. 408, 409 (1912) (stating
that "It]he period referred to in the expression 'heretofore used,' is the time which
antedates the adoption of the original Constitution, when the common law was in
force"); accord Smith v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 128 N.Y.S. 966, 967 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't. 1911) (reaching the same conclusion), affd, 96 N.E. 1106 (N.Y. 1911).
304 See In re DES Mkt. Share Litig., 591 N.E.2d 226 (N.Y. 1992); Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State, 550 N.E.2d 919, 921 (N.Y. 1990); see also DAVID D. SIEGEL,
NEW YORK PRACTICE § 377 (3d ed. 1999); WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8,
4101.06, at 41-21 to 41-24.
305 See In re Luria, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 14. In concluding that the 1894 constitution
updated the "heretofore used" period to 1894, Surrogate Sobel's influential opinion
acknowledged that this result was "probably unintentional as far as the proceedings
disclose." Id.
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just as logical to say that the delegates to the 1894 convention,
who simply copied the identical text306 of the 1846 constitution,
intended it to have the identical meaning it had then, i.e., that
the period covered by the guarantee was the period prior to
1846. This possibility seems at least as likely as the one
entailed by today's consensus that it was their intent to
constitutionalize, wholesale, all jury trial grants enacted after
the merger of law and equity in 1846, as contained in both the
Field and Throop Codes.
It is true that the 1846 constitution used the same formula
that was used in prior constitutions, but there was something
special about the situation in 1846. The framers of that
constitution were embarking on an experiment never before
attempted: the fusion of two court systems, one of which had
used juries, while the other had not. Their intent in using
familiar terminology was informed by live issues. They must
also have been aware of the significance of "heretofore used" as
related to the different modes of trial in the former courts of law
and equity and how it would apply in the new Supreme Court,
which was to have "general jurisdiction in law and equity."30 7
The First Report of the (Field) Commissioners makes it clear
that this was the case.308
This is the way the courts looked at the matter until recent
years.30 9 The transition from the older view to the current view
was based in part on the gratuitous assumption that the older
cases such as Moot simply overlooked the effect of the 1894
constitution.310 Such an assumption requires the belief that
many former judges and counsel had a memory block or were
ignorant of recent history. Before Moot was decided, the issue
had been thoroughly examined in conflicting Appellate Division
306 The word "copied" is used notwithstanding that the 1894 version deleted
two commas around the phrase "in all cases in which it has been heretofore used."
See infra note 311.
307 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1846).
308 See FIRST REPORT OF THE COMl0ISSIONERS, supra note 36, at 177.
309 See Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 54 N.E.2d 809, 810 (N.Y. 1944)
(expressly reaffirming the position taken by the Moot court).
- 310 See Mayers, supra note 23, at 185 n.25 (the first to make such a suggestion);
see also WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, 4101.07, at 41-24 to 41-26; N.Y. STATE
ADVISORY CONEL ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COAMHTTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Legis. Doc. No. 13, at
564-65 (1958).
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cases that referred to both the 1846 and 1894 constitutions.311
Furthermore, seven years before the Moot case was decided, the
author of that opinion, Chief Judge Willard Bartlett, had gone to
the trouble of writing a special concurrence 12 in which he
reviewed the text of the earlier constitutions and suggested that
the guaranteed period had been moved up to 1894.3 13 This novel
suggestion did not gain the approval of a majority when Judge
Bartlett wrote his concurring opinion in 1908, and by the time
he wrote the opinion in Moot in 1915, he had abandoned that
view.314 The Moot opinion, in which all the participating judges
concurred, was clearly anything but inadvertent.
The older view expressed in Moot was held by judges who
were closer to the climate of opinion surrounding the 1894
constitution than contemporary judges and other legal scholars.
In addition, the older view is the basis of actual holdings, and to
give more than lip service to the current view would require the
express overruling of several cases.315 On the other hand,
despite how often the current view has been repeated, this
author not believe the result of any case would be different if
that view were abandoned and the older position reaffirmed.3 16
311 See Halgren v. Halgren, 145 N.Y.S. 987, 988 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1914)
(quoting the 1894 constitution and stating that the issue of adultery was triable by
jury "before the adoption of the Constitution"); Cohen v. Cohen, 145 N.Y.S. 652, 656
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1914) (Clarke, J., dissenting) (asserting that the constitution of
1846 extended the period of the guarantee). There is an initial difficulty in
determining whether a citation, or even a quotation, from the constitutional
guarantee of jury trial refers to the 1894 or the 1846 constitutions, because both
have the same citation (Art. I, § 2) and the same language. Fortunately, for the
researcher, a potentially ambiguous quotation can be traced to its correct source by
a pair of commas. In the 1846 version, commas surround the phrase within the
sentence, "[tihe trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been heretofore used, shall
remain inviolate." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1846). In the 1894 version, there are no
commas around the phrase "in all cases in which it has been heretofore used." N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 2 (1894).
312 See Sporza v. German Sav. Bank, 84 N.E. 406, 411 (N.Y. 1908).
313 See id. at 411-12.
314 See supra text accompanying note 276 (noting that few had recognized that
the "heretofore used" guarantee was moved up to 1894).
315 See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, 4101.07, at 41-24 to 41-26. This
widely respected treatise suggests that subsequent references to Moot are dicta.
However, it must be mentioned that the same treatise admits that several cases
hold that trial by jury of legal counterclaims is governed only by statute, not the
constitution, despite the fact that the statute that had conferred the right was
passed in 1876, seventeen years before the constitution of 1894. See id. 4101.34,
at 41-65 to 41-67.
316 This proposition would be tested by a case striking down a statute passed
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Stare decisis places greater weight on what the courts have
actually decided, rather than on what they have merely stated,
however frequently they have stated it.
General history as well as legal history suggests that it
would be prudent to acknowledge the possibility of wisdom in
those judges who preceded the present generation. This author
does not suggest that they specifically foresaw that a future
legislature in 1963 would reconsider how best to try equitable
defenses. Still, it does seem rash simply to assume that there
was no cautionary purpose behind their studied refusal to
equate the effect of the jury trial article of the 1894 constitution
to that of the 1846 constitution. If the effect of the 1894
constitution is so clear, why then did Judge Cardozo in 1925
pass up the opportunity of shedding the blessings of
constitutional grace on his interpretation of the early statutes in
Susquehanna Steamship?31 7
The language chosen by the drafters of the 1938 constitution
also suggests an open mind. If they were convinced that the
1894 constitution had the effect now so widely supposed, it
would have been easy enough to make it clear. The problem of
promoting statutory rights to constitutional rights was called to
their attention.318 Instead of clearly resolving the issue, they left
the question open. Without referring to any date or period, they
said essentially, that we add nothing and we subtract nothing;
whatever is presently guaranteed by the constitution shall
continue to be guaranteed. As far as objectively verifiable
evidence takes us, the effect of the 1894 constitution is at the
very least an open question.
Finally, apart from every other consideration, it is a
legitimate judicial method to call a halt to a line of authority
when convinced that it leads in the wrong direction as a matter
of policy. This author believes this to be the situation with the
line of cases of comparatively recent vintage that have declared,
in dictum, that the 1894 constitution raised post-1846 statutory
jury rights to constitutional status.
after 1894, that derogated from a right to jury trial, that had been granted by a
statute between 1846 and 1894. This author is not aware of any such case.
317 "Cardozo generally liked to use all available arguments to bolster an
opinion." ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 282 (1998).
318 See In re Luria, 313 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14-15 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1970) (Sobel,
S.).
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CONCLUSION
The Advisory Commission that drafted the CPLR and the
leading text on New York civil practice both conclude that there
is no constitutional problem with the rule contained in CPLR
4101-that equitable defenses are triable by the court. These
authorities maintain that while the 1894 constitution elevated
all prior statutory jury trial rights to constitutionally
guaranteed rights, there was no statutory right to jury trial of
equitable defenses to legal actions prior to 1894. But the
sections of the Civil Practice Act that Cardozo interpreted in
Susquehanna Steamship each carried forward, without material
change, sections of the Throop Code and, in turn, the Field Code.
Of course, we are all children of legal realism, and no longer
believe in the pious fiction that, unlike legislation, a court
decision states what the law has always been. Cardozo's
interpretation of what the relevant statutes meant to the court
in 1925 creates at most a rebuttable presumption of what they
always meant. Perhaps contemporary critics have just such a
notion in mind when they say that jury trial of equitable
defenses was not the rule prior to the 1894 constitution. It is as
if the rule sprang full-grown from the brow of Cardozo when he
uttered it in his Susquehanna Steamship opinion. Cardozo
would be surprised to hear of that speculation. He did not rest
his holding on a legal fiction, however benign. Although he did
not refer to the 1894 constitution, he made it clear that the way
he interpreted the statutes was the way they had been
interpreted in the past.
Now that the genesis of jury trial of equitable defenses is
under reexamination in the context of the "heretofore used"
clause of the 1894 constitution, we are required to verify
whether Cardozo's interpretation was in fact acted upon in the
pre-1894 cases. Did those cases routinely use juries as a matter
of right in adjudicating equitable defenses to legal actions? 19
319 It is interesting to speculate on what the court could have done in
Susquehanna Steamship, if it had been convinced that the traditional
interpretation was mistaken and that a better interpretation called for non-jury
trial of equitable defenses. This indeed would have required a decisive holding on
the effect of the 1894 constitution. If the period covered by the guarantee was
moved up to 1894, there is no escape from the conclusion that because juries were
"used" from the beginning as a matter of right, the "heretofore used" clause of that
constitution would have frozen that usage into a constitutional right, however
misguided it may have been as an original matter of statutory interpretation. See
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This author finds himself in the curious position of
concurring with the result reached by the leading authorities-
recognizing the validity of CPLR 4101-while rejecting both of
the grounds relied upon by them. Research of the early cases
and statutes shows that the use of juries to try equitable
defenses in legal actions dates back to the earliest days of the
Field Code, with the consequence that the practice became
constitutionally guaranteed in 1894, unless the effect of that
constitution is different from what it is presently believed to be.
As to the latter question, a more tentative conclusion is set
forth. There is undoubtedly room for difference of opinion on the
effect of the 1894 constitution, and it is conceded that this
author's view runs up against a settled climate of opinion.
Nevertheless, a fresh look at the question is justified. If viewed
as an open question, the weight of reason, authority and sound
policy favors a return to the older view. In other words, the
period covered by the guarantee copied verbatim in the 1894
constitution from the 1846 constitution, is the period preceding
the merger of law and equity in 1846. If this is so, jury trial of
equitable defenses, when raised as "an issue of fact" in the
enumerated legal actions set forth in the Field and Throop
Codes, remained purely statutory when the 1938
constitution was adopted, and was validly changed by the CPLR
in 1963.
supra text accompanying note 272 (discussing the remarks of the California court).
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